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PROJECT COMPLETION
REPORT NO. 343X

A Model of Community Problem Solving and Selected Empirical Applications

December 31, 1971

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United States Department
of the Interior

CONTRACT NO.
B-022-OHIO
MG 14-31-0001-3116

Project Completion Report

A MODEL OF COMMUNITY PROBLEM SOLVING

and

SELECTED EMPIRICAL APPLICATIONS

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MG 14-31-0001-3116

December 31, 1971

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Part 1

A Model of

Community Problem Solving

There are a number of ways in which attempts to cope with water resource problems can be approached. One way which will be explored here is to develop a model of community problem solving which is general, i.e., which cuts across the variety of community problems, but at the same time has explanatory power in understanding specific problems -- water related ones. What will be outlined here is a model of community decision making which has sufficient generality to apply to a number of communities. In addition, the model centers on the exercise of social power.

The Model: Community Structural Variables and the Characteristics of the Leadership Pool

The exercise of social power does not occur in a vacuum. When examining social power in any system, one must consider the relationship of this phenomenon to other system properties and to factors that impinge upon the system from its environment. The assumption that the nature, distribution, structure, and exercise of power in a system is related to intra- and inter-systemic variables is the central foundation of this study.

At the community level of analysis, various dimensions of the "power structure" would appear to be affected by community structural variables. For example, the structure of a community may influence such factors as who in the community has power; what institutional and organizational units are represented in the "power structure;" the interrelationship among the power actors; how power is exercised; what conditions existent in the community are perceived and defined by the power actors as problems; and what structure of action the power actors employ to ameliorate these defined problems. While

we will not be utilizing these same terms, we will be considering similar questions in the following pages.

The model is concerned with the relationships between four general sets of variables, or "dimension-sets": (1) community structural variables, (2) characteristics of the "leadership pool" of the community, (3) variables related to the "leadership pool's" perception and definition of community problems, and (4) variables related to the types of community action that are proposed by the "leadership pool" to assuage these problems. This model is processual. It posits, as shown in Figure I, that community structural variables will affect the characteristics of

Figure I

A PROCESSUAL MODEL FOR COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS



the "leadership pool" (A). Furthermore, the characteristics of the "leadership pool" will influence what, how, and why certain conditions existent in the community are perceived and defined as problems (B). Finally, the nature of these community problem definitions will effect the types of action proposed by the "leadership pool" to correct these problems (C). The model is also concerned with perception. What is the nature of the perception and definition of problems, how do various problem definitions differ, what do they share in

common, does the "leadership pool" perceive problems that are objectively present in the community, etc.? Therefore, in this study we will not be concerned with questions relevant to the exercise of power per se. While questions such as, "how does the 'leadership pool' influence decisions?" are interesting and legitimate, at this time we will be concerned solely with the "leadership pool's" definition of problems and its proposals for action.

In this section we will present the first two dimension-sets in the model. We will be concerned specifically with the structural dimensions, i.e., the community structural variables and the characteristics of the leadership pool. These dimensions will be defined and the specific variables included in each set will be examined and operationally defined. Furthermore, justification for the inclusion of the variables on empirical and/or theoretical grounds will be given. Finally, illustrative propositions interrelating these two sets of variables will be posed.

Community Structural Variables

The first set of dimensions in the model are those relevant to the structure of the community. The relationship between the structure of a community and the processes and patterns of behavior to be found in it has been an issue of theoretical and empirical concern for many years.

The number of structural variables that could be included in the model is manifold. We will consider only those structural elements of the community that would appear to effect the distribution, structure, and exercise of social power in the community. The selection of these elements is deductively based upon previous theoretical or empirical works. In addition, a certain amount of "face validity" is evident in the selection.

The variables included in our model are population size, demographic heterogeneity, community autonomy, governmental structure, organizational density, economic heterogeneity (economic base), and social class. It should first be noted that these variables are only relevant to comparative studies within the United States; there are no cross-cultural variables included in the model. With the increasing scale of society, the national cultural components are somewhat controlled. If the model was applied to communities in different cultural settings, these variables would have to be included. Also, if communities in different regional areas of the United States were to be compared, the regional variables should also be considered.

Let us now turn to a brief discussion of each of these variables. We will attempt to more explicitly define these concepts, offer justification for their inclusion in the model, and propose possible operational indicators for each of them.

A. Population Size and Rate of Growth

The relationship between the size of the population in any system and other properties of the system has long been an issue of theoretical and empirical concern. Generally, it is assumed that an increase in the number of inhabitants in a system, in this case the community, leads to increasing structural differentiation. Many examples of the relationship of size to other elements of the community could be offered. With increasing size the system is faced with providing additional and expanded services to the community. Additional strain is placed upon those elements of the community concerned with such functions as social control, socialization, mutual support, and general system integration. With increasing numbers of inhabitants, the provision of general services, such as streets, sewers, parks,

sanitation, utilities, etc. becomes problematic. Local government is faced with the problem of increasing these services, as well as being confronted with other issues such as an increasing need for zoning, larger police and fire departments, traffic congestion and transportation flow, etc. Other elements of the community, such as the school system, production-distribution-consumption subsystem, the financial, health, and religious institutions, etc., also face problems regarding the distribution of services and increased functional requisites. In sum, the resultant structural differentiation associated with increasing size affects all the elements of the community system.

It would appear that the population size of a community would also affect the distribution and structure of power in the system. The structure of power in a small, rural, mid-western service town is obviously different than that in New York City. With increasing size, structural elaboration and differentiation, it would appear that the power structure would be more pluralistic. Furthermore, the government and political institutions would apparently play major roles in the local power complex due to an increase in the demands for governmental services, increased size of the governmental bureaucracy, and more numerous full-time political roles.

While size can be posed as a crucial structural variable, we must make one qualification. It appears to us that growth rates may actually be a more sensitive, precise indicator than size of increasing structural differentiation. For the size variable to be meaningful, large differences in community size must be examined; a difference in community size of one to five thousand, for example, may not entail large differences in structural differentiation among comparative communities. Communities of basically the same size may,

however, have very different growth rates. These differences in the growth rates could have serious implications for the distribution and structure of power. A city with a growth rate of 40 percent faces different types of problems and stresses than one with a rate of 4 percent, even though they are of similar size! In the former, massive strain is placed upon local institutions to provide services to the proportionately larger population. The demands on local government become particularly pressing as such "mundane" concerns as the extension of sewer and water lines, street improvements, zoning, etc., suddenly become major issues. Furthermore, with a large rate of growth, other areas, particularly business and industry, may expand. The increased rate of growth and structural differentiation may lead to fracturing of the old normative order as new life styles and values are intruded upon the community. A community in such a state of increasing scale would appear to foster a pluralistic power structure, in which power would tend to be confined to specific institutional areas and the exercise of power would take place through exchange and coalition formation. It would appear, therefore, that controlling for size, the greater the rate of population growth, the more pluralistic the power structure.

B. Demographic Heterogeneity

Demographic heterogeneity refers to the degree to which the population of a community is divided along ethnic, and particularly in the latter twentieth century, racial lines. The greater the number of racial and ethnic groups, the greater the demographic heterogeneity. The distribution, structure, and exercise of power in a community would appear to be influenced by the degree of heterogeneity in the population. We previously noted that one of the bases of social power was subsystem solidarity. When the population

of a community is heterogenous, this base may become a valuable resource for potential power actors. Particularly in communities where subcultures and subgroups are socially visible and organized, they and their spokesmen may become important actors in the leadership pool. The rise of certain ethnic groups to positions of leadership in the political and economic institutions in American cities during the late 19th and early 20th centuries is an obvious example. Currently, the "Black Movement" is attempting to alter the distribution and structure of power not only in the local community, but in the larger society as well. Of course, cleavages in the community associated with demographic heterogeneity facilitate the development of conflict, as groups attempt to realize their vested interests in the system. Due, therefore, to the expansion of the resource of subsystem solidarity, we would propose that the greater the demographic heterogeneity in the community, the more pluralistic or decentralized the decision-making structure.

C. Community Autonomy

There is an increasing concern in sociology with the relationship of community autonomy to other elements of the community system. Two related notions are implied in these discussions. First, there is the proposition that with the increasing scale of our society, the spread of vast organizational networks throughout the land, increased federal and state financing of local community projects, development of regional and national markets, etc., local people have become unable to determine the goals, policies, and operations of local community units. The local community is now dependent upon external sources, such as state governments and central offices which make key decisions affecting the life of the community. The growing number of ties between the local community and non-local units and networks is viewed as having weakened

local community integration. As the community is drawn into the larger society, the local unit ceases to be a viable, decision-making entity.

There is, however, a second, related use of the concept of autonomy. The term may be applied to the degree of functional autonomy at the local level. The question in this case is the extent to which local community institutions perform requisite functions having locality relevance. The issue concerns, if you will, the viability of the local institutions. A local governmental institution could be viewed as autonomous if it provided essential services and performed crucial functions for the community system as the local level. A nonautonomous, or dependent, nonviable governmental institution, however, would be one which provided fewer services and functions. As a result, the local community residents would have to go elsewhere for these services. Obviously, if a local government does not provide parks, child-welfare services, hospital services, police and fire protection, etc., it is a less viable, autonomous institution than one that does. The autonomy of the economic institution can be similarly examined by measuring the extent to which it performs vital functions for the relevant locality, such functions as providing jobs for the local population.

Local autonomy, therefore, involves the ability of local individuals, groups, and organizations to determine the goals, policies, and operations of the community, and the existence of viable, functionally-autonomous, locally based institutions. As a structural variable, the degree of local autonomy would apparently affect the distribution, structure, and exercise of power in the community. Increasing non-local involvement and lessening functional-autonomy would alter many of the bases of social power, such as control over wealth, the media, jobs, knowledge and specialized skills, manpower and

control of organizations, and control over the interpretation of values. Furthermore, new resources and sanctions are introduced with increasing vertical ties to the larger society. These provide new and enlarged bases of social power.

Absentee-ownership has often been used as an indicator of autonomy. Clark has proposed that the degree of absentee-ownership is directly related to the distribution of power. He notes the withdrawal from community affairs by the executives of these corporations, and proposed that the greater the number of absentee-owned enterprises in the community, the more decentralized the decision-making structure.[1]

> In many communities -- particularly the smaller, functionally unspecialized ones -- if a single sector dominates community decision making, it tends to be the economic sector. Within the economic sector, it is the owners or managers of the largest locally owned and managed enterprises who tend to dominate. Consequently, factors leading to a decrease in the (instrumental) community-wide activities of executives of local enterprises tend to lead to a more decentralized decision-making structure. Absentee-ownership is one important factor in the noninvolvement of executives from large enterprises, which in turn influences the community decision-making structure.[2]

Recently, conceptual and empirical studies have directly considered the relationship of autonomy to the distribution of power. Warren has posed a negative relationship between local autonomy and a broad distribution of community decision-making power. He notes that autonomy denotes local control over maximally localized institutions. "In operation, it would take the form of the least possible absentee-ownership and in general the fewest possible organizational ties, both in the economy and in other sectors, to more inclusive organizations outside the community.[3] The less autonomous the community, the broader the distribution of local power.

Walton empirically found the same relationship in a study of fifty-five communities.[4] He found that the presence of absentee-owned corporations, competitive party politics, adequate economic resources and satellite status are positively related with the presence of competitive power structures. Walton proposed that each of these variables reflects the interdependence of the community and extracommunity centers of power, i.e., they are indicators of autonomy. Therefore, he offers the proposition that "to the extent that the local community becomes increasingly interdependent with respect to extra-community institutions ... the structure of local leadership becomes more competitive.[5]

Thus, there is substantial justification in the literature for including the autonomy variable in our model. The crucial issue, however, is to isolate what elements of the concept have the greatest utility for our model. The concept of autonomy encompasses many variables; it is an "open" concept. It would appear, however, that limiting the concept to the economic and governmental-political institutions would be valuable. The structures of these two institutional areas are crucial determinates of the distribution and structure of power in the community. Both of these institutions are directly relevant to many of the bases of power. As we have noted, many writers have examined economic autonomy by utilizing such indicators as absentee-ownership. It has been offered that decreased economic autonomy results in a broader distribution of community power for various reasons. When the executives of absentee-owned corporations withdraw from local affairs, they also withdraw important resources from the available supply of power bases; a "leveling effect" tends to result. However, when they are active in local issues, they also tend to widen the distribution of power by intruding new tactics, life

styles, values, resources (e.g., taxes) etc., into the local system -- not to mention simply increasing the number of competing actors who potentially have the resources to be influential. Furthermore, when the locus for such important economic decisions having community-wide implications as personnel layoffs or the relocation of plants lies outside the community, the viability of the local decision-making structure is weakened.

The degree of political and governmental autonomy is also relevant to the distribution of power. If a large percentage of local government revenue and services comes from outside sources, the autonomy and resource base of the local government institution may be weakened. For instance, the decision to allocate certain funds to the local community from state sources obviously entails a decision whose locus is outside the community, and whose resolution is only indirectly influenced by the local citizens.

Economic and political autonomy may vary independently of each other. From the literature we have noted that where both institutions are autonomous, there is a tendency for an elitist structure of power to be existent in the community. Where they are both dependent, the tendency is toward pluralism. With political-dependence and economic-autonomy, one would expect a more pluralistic system, but with strong economic influence. Political autonomy and economic dependence would be still more pluralistic, but with strong governmental and political influence.

D. Governmental Structure

The structure of local government in the United States basically varies along three dimensions: the locus of executive authority, the method of electing representatives, and the type of ballot used. At one extreme is what may be called a traditional, political structure. In this form executive

authority resides in the office of a mayor; representatives are elected by ward or district; and a partisan ballot is utilized. The other basic form of government is often labeled a "reform" or "good government" structure. In this case, executive authority resides in the position of the city manager; representation is on an at-large basis; and a non-partisan ballot is used. These three dimensions, however, need not -- and do not -- vary together. They are independent dimensions and can appear in any combination. Also, a combination of at-large and district representation is often included with the other two variables. There is a tendency, though, for them to appear in the above configurations.

The governmental structure of the local community would appear to affect the distribution and structure of social power in the total community system. Obviously government has the legal basis of power in the local system. The structure of this legal, authoritatively-based power would appear to be relevant to the configuration of other elements of social power in the community. For example, it is generally assumed that administrative authority reaches its highest degree of centralization and articulation in the city manager, as opposed to the mayor, form of government. If this is the case, in cities with city manager governments, with less direct political control and involvement with the executive office, one might expect greater governmental influence in the leadership pool. Also, we must remember that the "good government" structure was proposed as a "reform" of the traditional structure. This reform was aimed at eliminating corruption, "bossism," and political "in-fighting" from local government, and increasing citizen participation in the political process. If citizen participation does in fact increase, power becomes more dispersed and the structure more pluralistic.

The consequences, however, of these contrasting structures are not clear. It may also be that certain elements of the traditional structure -- particularly ward or district representation -- may also increase citizen participation and result in increased pluralism. With district representation the councilman or alderman is directly responsible to a constituency which shares common problems and expectations due to ecological, racial, and/or class similarities. Where these groups have some control over their representative through the ballot box, they may have more direct influence in the structure of power. Of course, a crucial assumption of either position that may not be tenable is that the local government is a viable, important element in the local power structure.

E. Organizational Density

The concept of organizational density refers to the number of voluntary organizations in the community relative to the size of the community's population. Certain communities suffer from "organizational poverty." They have few organizations relative to the number of citizens. Since voluntary organizations are major "linking mechanisms" within the community, a community with few organizations may face problems with system integration. At the other extreme are those communities that are epitomized by "organizational saturation." The number of voluntary organizations is extremely high in relationship to the size of the population.

This structural variable would appear to influence the distribution and structure of power. A voluntary organization represents (1) a potential basis of response in any community issue, (2) a resource whose control may serve as an important base of power, and (3) a potential power actor in its own right. A community with a high density of organizations simply has more

voices that could potentially be heard in any issue, and more organized groups with relevant resources who can enter controversies than one in the situation of "organizational poverty." Such a situation would logically tend to distribute power more widely within the system, and thus influence the power structure toward the direction of pluralism.

An obvious operational indicator of this variable is a comparison of the number of voluntary organizations to the size of the population in the community. Such a ratio would provide at least a crude index, although such additional indicators as total organizational membership and the percentage of the community population that are members of local organizations could also be used.

F. Economic Base

The type of economic structure existent in the community should logically affect the distribution, structure, and exercise of power. Many of the resources that can be utilized as bases of power are defined, controlled, and distributed by the economic structure. More specifically, two elements of the economic structure appear to be of crucial relevance. First, the major economic function performed in the community is a particularly powerful factor influencing other structural elements and system characteristics. A number of studies have examined such differences between manufacturing, retail trade, agricultural, resort, financial, governmental, educational, and diversified cities.[6] Actors representing the dominant economic activity in the community would obviously be included in the power structure due to the resources they control. Also, the overall structure of leadership would appear to be related to the dominant function. For example, the leadership pool of an industrial city would probably include actors from management and labor; in a retail trade city, one could expect to find businessmen; in an educational center, maybe professors and administrators.

Second, the diversification of the economic base would also appear relevant. Where there is little diversification in the economic base, the dominant economic institution has a greater proportion of the relevant resources; a proportion that can become a monopoly. In a one-industry town, the centralization of such resources as money and wealth and control over jobs facilitates the formation of an elite power structure. Diversification of the economic base, however, tends to widen the distribution of resources. There are fewer actors with great quantities of resources, but many actors with some power. In such a situation actors can exchange resources that are issue relevant, form coalitions to increase their power base, or only attempt to exercise power in those areas where their resources are most applicable. Therefore, the greater the diversification of the economic base, the more pluralistic the structure of power.

G. Social Class

Sociologists have utilized social class as an independent variable in investigating such diverse phenomena as political attitudes and behavior, the etiology of mental illness, fertility and family size, pre-marital sexual behavior, and preference for social change. It would appear that the social class dimension of the community would affect the distribution and structure of local power. Two aspects of social class appear to be relevant: (1) the amount of hierarchical differentiation and the horizontal shape of the local stratification system, and (2) the median class level of the community.

Concerning the initial class dimension, the relationship of the shape of the local stratification system to the distribution of power is not conceptually clear, nor has it been empirically investigated. One might argue that in a community characterized by class homogeneity, with little vertical spread and

differentiation in the class structure, power would tend to be widely distributed due to the wide distribution of power relevant resources. Where there is a great spread between the highest and lowest classes, however, and a large degree of differentiation with little social mobility, one might expect a more elitist structure of power due to the centralization and control of resources by the upper classes. Other factors, however, such as social access to the community leaders may contaminate such a relationship. Also, the shape of the local stratification system is so highly interrelated with many of the other structural variables that its effect may be difficult to isolate.

The overall class level of the community must also be considered. It might be proposed that the higher the median class level of the community (measured by such variables as median income and median education) the more widely distributed the decision-making structure. We have already noted that political participation increases with social class position. Furthermore, such power resources as money and wealth, knowledge and specialized skills, control over jobs and mass media, etc., are class relevant variables. The inclusion of social class in the model, therefore, appears to be justified.

In summary, in the above section we have presented the structural variables that are included in our model. We have attempted to justify their inclusion on the basis of previous work in the field, and on the basis of their logical, theoretical relationship to the structure of power. We have not posited hypotheses systematically associating them with characteristics of the leadership pool. The explication of such propositions will follow the next section in which the latter characteristics will be presented.

Before turning to that section, we must note the issue of covariance. It is obvious from even a cursory examination of these variables that they

are not independent. For example, factors such as social class, demographic heterogeneity, size, rate of population growth, and autonomy are interrelated. These interrelationships create problems for analysis that must not be minimized. These variables have been selected because of their apparent association with the distribution, structure, and exercise of power.

Characteristics of the Leadership Pool

The second set of dimensions in our model are those variables which are relevant to a description of the distribution and structure of social power. These dimensions include: (1) size of the leadership pool, (2) institutional dominance, (3) social class composition of the leadership pool, (4) legitimacy, (5) visibility, (6) scope of influence, (7) cohesiveness, (8) entrenchment, and (9) cosmopolitan-localite orientation. These variables have been selected because they present a fairly complete picture of the distribution and structure of power. Furthermore, variation in the structure of leadership along these dimensions would appear to affect the leadership pool's perception and definition of community problems. The reader will note that the traditional "elitist-pluralist" or "monomorphic-polymorphic" dimensions are not included in the model. Actually, these dimensions are included, but are broken into four separate indicators: legitimacy, visibility, scope of influence, and cohesiveness. For example, a traditional economic elite, such as Hunter found in Atlanta, would be characterized by low legitimacy, low visibility, a broad scope of influence, and high cohesiveness. These dimensions may, however, vary independently. Therefore, examining them separately is more advantageous than lumping them together and utilizing the more gross concepts of "elitist-pluralist" or "monomorphic-polymorphic."

Before we turn to an explication of each of these variables, and subsequently relate them to the previously mentioned community structural variables, let us define more precisely what we mean by a leadership pool.

A. Definition

We shall define as the leadership pool THOSE COMPONENTS OF ANY SOCIAL SYSTEM, BE THEY INDIVIDUALS, GROUPS, OR ORGANIZATIONS, THAT ARE IDENTIFIED AS POSSESSING SUPERORDINATE SOCIAL POWER AND THE ABILITY TO AFFECT THE PROCESSES IN THE SYSTEM.

Before we attempt to dissect this definition, perhaps a few comments about our choice of the term "leadership pool" to describe the group of power actors in the community is necessary. The obvious question is "why not use 'power structure' or 'power elite' like everybody else?" While we will not enter into a full discussion of our preference for "leadership pool" as opposed to these other concepts, let us only note a few basic reasons. The term "power structure" seems to imply a highly structured, rather static, elitist model of the group of community power actors. As Delbert Miller states, research and methodology in this area have been greatly impeded by the term, elite.[7] If any segment of our conceptual or methodological apparatus should have a decent burial, it is this misleading term. The term implies a high solidarity and a consensus on goals and values among a community's power actors. This solidarity and consensus must be questions for empirical research, not a priori assumptions. The term "pool" implies no such consensus or "smoke-filled room" imagery.

Furthermore, the term "power structure" has become a part of everyday language; it has also become a value-laden term, connoting all that is sinister, corrupt, amoral, and decadent within our society. Being synonymous with "the

establishment," it has become a meaningless term for scientific analysis. Its emotional value as a rhetorical device may be great; its conceptual merit, however, is minimal.

It must be noted, however, that the concept, structure, does have a value that must not be overlooked. Structure implies the existence of some form of patterned relationships among the power actors. It highlights the point that a network of influence is often brought to bear upon many decisions in the community. This interaction among power actors often is necessitated because each actor has power resting upon various bases and resources. Some of these resources may be more relevant for one issue as opposed to another. By interacting and bargaining with other actors, by utilizing the tactics of exchange, cooptation, and coalition, a network of power may form.

Of course, the nature of the relationships among power actors and even the existence of such relationships also must be empirically proven, not assumed. Again, the term "pool" -- while not disregarding these relationships -- does not infer these unwarranted assumptions.

Let us now turn to an explication of the dimensions of the leadership pool. The method we will utilize is similar to that we followed in presenting the community structural variables. In addition, we will offer a few illustrative propositions relating these first two components of our model.

B. Size of the Leadership Pool

The number of actors in the leadership pool is an obvious, but important, dimension. Size may be a good indicator of the centralization of decision making. Where the leadership pool is small (relative to the size of the community population) we might assume that a more centralized leadership structure exists in which superordinate power is held by a few individuals.

Of course, where the number of power actors is large, power is more decentralized. Furthermore, the scope of power in the latter situation would appear to be rather narrow. Cohesiveness among the power actors would tend to be rather weak as the possible networks of exchange and coalition formation increase geometrically with an arithmetic increase in the number of actors. With a large number of power actors, conflicts over goals, values, tactics, priorities, etc., may be numerous. The vested interests of each actor have a catalytic effect upon the structure and exercise of power.

Any community structural variable that increases or decreases the quantity of the power-relevant resources in the system; distributes these resources throughout the system; and/or generally affects citizen participation in the decision-making structure would appear to be a determinant of the size of the leadership pool. Therefore, a number of propositions may be offered. These propositions are illustrative. Some have empirical support; others are logically deducted from the model. They should be viewed as irreversible, stochastic, coextensive, sufficient, and substitutable propositions. This list, and all of the other illustrative lists, is not inclusive. A matrix of proposed relationships will be presented at the end of this section.

Illustrative Propositions:

The larger the population size of the community, the larger the size of the leadership pool.

The greater the rate of population growth in the community, the larger the size of the leadership pool.

The greater the demographic heterogeneity in the community, the larger the size of the leadership pool.

The greater the economic and government dependence (the less the autonomy) of the community, the larger the size of the leadership pool.

The greater the economic diversification in the community, the larger the size of the leadership pool.

The greater the organizational density in the community, the larger the size of the leadership pool.

The higher the social class level of the community, the larger the size of the leadership pool.

We have included the size of the leadership pool in our model also because this variable would appear to be related to the perception and definition of local community problems. The larger the number of power actors, the larger the number of perceived problems, the greater the difficulty in reaching consensus concerning priority, and the more difficult the coordination of ameliorative action.

C. Institutional Dominance

This variable refers to the extent to which a single institution dominates the leadership pool in the community. There are two elements to this dimension. First, the extent of perceived power residing in the institution, as an institution, e.g., the "power" of the educational, religious, economic, political, etc., institutions. Second, the extent to which actors from the institution are represented in the leadership pool. At one logical end of the continuum are those communities in which perceived power and representation reside in a single institution. At the other extreme are those communities in which power is equally distributed across the institutional areas. More likely, however, are those cases where power is decentralized and shared by a few institutions. Due to their inordinate share of power-relevant resources,

the political and economic institutions are often found in some sort of uneasy, symbiotic relationship. For the researcher, therefore, the crucial question is "Is there institutional dominance?" If the answer is yes, then "By whom?"

We again find that those structural variables which affect the quantity and distribution of the bases of social power also will influence the extent and nature of institutional dominance in the leadership pool. Where the structure of the community is such that these resources are widely distributed across the institutions, there is less likelihood of any single institution dominating the leadership pool. Where the resources are centralized in one institution, however, the probability is that the favored institution may dominate the system.

Illustrative Propositions:

The larger the population size of the community, the less likely is the dominance of one institution in the leadership pool.

The greater the demographic heterogeneity in the community, the less likely is the dominance of one institution in the leadership pool.

The greater the economic and governmental dependence (i.e., the less the autonomy) of the community on external sources, the less likely is the dominance of one institution in the leadership pool.

The greater the economic dependence and governmental autonomy of the community, the more likely is the political institution to be dominant.

The greater the economic autonomy and governmental dependence of the community, the more likely is the economic institution to be dominant.

The greater the organizational density in the community, the less likely is the dominance of one institution in the leadership pool.

The higher the social class level of the community, the less likely is the dominance of one institution in the leadership pool.

These propositions require a few comments. It should be noted that empirical support for these propositions generally is lacking. It may be that the relationships are not linear. For example, we have noted that with increasing population size and/or rapid population growth, the governmental institution may become more important. Also, in very small, non-autonomous communities, the government may be powerful because it has no competitors! Therefore, the relationship may be curvilinear, with government being dominant at the extreme ends of the population continuum. These propositions, however, are presented heuristically; they are deductively drawn. In analysis, however, the possibility of non-linear associations must not be forgotten. Finally, there is no logical empirical or theoretical justification for positing the existence or nature of an association between such independent structural variables as reform government and our dependent variable of institutional dominance. With the reform government variable, for example, one might argue that the more reformist the character of the governmental institution, the less likely is the dominance by a single institution -- because of increased citizen participation associated with the reformist form of government. However, it may also be that the governmental institution itself becomes dominant for exactly the same reason! While there is not a prior justification for proposing the direction of these associations, they will be included in the matrix presentation of propositions that follows this section and can be empirically investigated.

It is obvious that the variable of institutional dominance may affect the definition and perception of community problems. If power, for example,

does reside in the economic institution, one may find that the perceived problems of the leadership pool are economic in nature, or at least may affect the economic institution of the community. Other problems may be viewed and attacked by the strategy of "benign neglect". If power resides in two different institutions, however, such as the economic and the religious, one may find that the defined problems center around these institutions but that there is little agreement as to the priority of the problems on the part of the power actors. It is believed, therefore, that institutional dominance will affect the number of problems defined and perceived as existent in the community, the priority of the perceived and defined problems, the agreement among the power actors as to the priority of community problems, etc.

D. Social Class Composition of the Leadership Pool

Probably no other dimension of the distribution of power in the community has received more attention than the class level of the leaders. It is basically because of this emphasis that we have included this variable in our model. The literature exhibits remarkable agreement concerning the class level of the leadership pool.

How do the social characteristics of the power actors compare to those of the other community residents? Bohlen compared the personal and social attributes of the power actors with those of a random sample in the same community. The six personal and social characteristics that differed significantly in comparing the two groups were occupation, mean gross family income, education, political orientation, age, and home ownership. The power actors were found to have significantly higher status occupations, higher incomes, more formal education, a different political orientation, higher age, and greater home ownership than the random sample. The two groups were found

not to differ in the number of people living in the household and the length of residence in the community.[8]

We could continue to review studies, but the findings are all similar. The power actors are a privileged lot. The "typical power actor" is probably fairly old (at least over 40), college educated, financially well-off, and a business and professional man who has lived a fairly long time in the community. This finding is practically tautological! High social status is based upon those resources that are also power-relevant. We can expect the leadership pool, therefore, to be composed of power actors with relatively high, homogenous class levels; levels that are probably higher than the class level of the community due to the selectivity of "resource rich" actors into the leadership pool.

The question becomes one of simply "how high?"

This association of our community structural variables to the dependent variable of social class composition of the leadership pool is the most confused, "messy" relationship in the first section of the model. Any structural variable that (1) increases the median class level of the community and (2) increases the participation of high status actors in the leadership pool would increase the class level of the leadership pool. Any variable, however, which functions to widen the distribution of power relevant resources, or to strengthen a power resource which is not class defined (such as subsystem solidarity) might act to lower the class level of the leadership pool. For some of the variables -- size, rate of population growth, autonomy, and economic diversity -- we cannot predict the direction of the relationship prior to the empirical study. Perhaps our best clue is that more pluralistic

systems in which power is widely distributed would tend to be lower in class level than more centralized, elitist systems.

Illustrative Propositions:

The more reformist the character of local government, the lower the social class level of the leadership pool. (Due to an increase in general citizen participation in local affairs; the professionalization of the governmental institution, etc.)

The greater the demographic heterogeneity in the community, the lower the social class level of the leadership pool.

The greater the organizational density, the higher the social class level of the leadership pool.

The higher the social class level of the community, the higher the social class level of the leadership.

We will discuss the relationship of the social class composition of the leadership pool to the perception and definition of community problems in the next section. Let us note that we will utilize education and occupation as our indicator of the social class composition of the leadership pool.

E. Legitimacy

The next four variables in this dimension-set were first presented by Thomas J. Anton.[9] These four variables -- legitimacy, visibility, scope of influence, and cohesiveness -- are extremely important in describing the structure of power in the community. Furthermore, these variables are the major components of the "elitist-pluralist" dimensions.

Legitimacy is the first of these variables. One of the major points of contention between the elitists and pluralists (and between sociologists and political scientists) is the relative importance of the authority component

versus the influence component of power in local affairs. The concept of legitimacy taps this dimension. Where leaders hold public or associational office, the leadership pool is an authoritative one. Where the majority of power actors do not hold official office, the pool can be viewed as non-authoritative. The former pool would be classified as "legitimate"; the latter as "non-legitimate". This dimension should be viewed as a continuum, with some leadership pools being more "legitimate" than others.

The extent to which a leadership pool is "legitimate" has many ramifications for both the distribution and exercise of power in the community. For example, when legitimacy is high, the citizenry of the community has a more direct channel of pressure and influence (e.g., the ballot box) on the power actors. Increased legitimacy would tend to facilitate increased pluralism. Taken to its logical extreme, one finds a Jeffersonian democracy in which power is widely distributed, but is legitimately embedded in the office. In a community with a "non-legitimate" leadership pool, however, in which economic actors dominate, the power actors are more isolated from citizen pressure and sanction. They are more free to exercise power without concern for a constituency. In such a situation, their "vested interests" may be pursued with reckless abandon -- only thwarted by the effects of the other power actors. The vast bulk of the citizenry has little opportunity to directly influence these power actors. As we shall see, they may not even know who they are.

We propose that the degree of legitimacy in the leadership pool is strongly influenced by the structure of the community. Those structural variables that function to increase the concentration of power-relevant resources in the governmental institution relative to the other institutions would appear to foster increased legitimacy. Furthermore, in communities

where there is a great need for governmental services, such as those which exhibit great or rapidly increasing structural differentiation, the degree of legitimacy may increase. With these assumptions of structural differentiation, high governmental influence relative to other areas, and the implicit notion of citizen participation, we present the following propositions.

Illustrative Propositions:

The larger the population size of the community, the more legitimate the leadership pool.

The greater the rate of population growth in the community, the more legitimate the leadership pool.

The greater the demographic heterogeneity in the community, the more legitimate the leadership pool.

The greater the economic and governmental dependence (i.e., the less the autonomy) of the community on external sources, the more legitimate the leadership pool.

The greater the economic dependence and governmental autonomy of the community, the more legitimate the leadership pool.

The greater the economic autonomy and governmental dependence of the community, the less legitimate the leadership pool.

The more reformist the character of the local government in the community, the more legitimate the leadership pool.

The greater the organizational density in the community, the more legitimate the leadership pool.

The higher the social class level of the community, the more legitimate the leadership pool.

The greater the economic diversity in the community, the more legitimate the leadership pool.

With one of the core concerns of this model being the relationship between the structure of the leadership pool and the leadership pool's perception and definition of community problems, the degree of legitimacy appears to be a crucial independent variable also. Where the leadership pool is legitimate, we might expect (1) a large number of different problems to be defined (due to the channels which various citizens have to reach those with legitimate power); (2) problems to represent either governmental or "the total community's" concerns; (3) the government to be viewed as responsible for a large proportion of the problems; (4) a higher level of agreement concerning the urgency and priority of these problems, etc. By comparison, a community with a relatively non-legitimate leadership pool might have fewer perceived and defined problems. Furthermore, these problems might represent "issue specific" (i.e., business, industry, education, etc.) concerns over which there is little agreement.

F. Visibility

Anton's second variable is visibility. The concept refers to the extent to which the power actors are covert, "behind-the-scenes" manipulators. (It must be remembered that a central issue in the "elitist-pluralist" debate was the degree to which the power actors were covert. This variable makes the question an empirical, not a rhetorical, one.) This dimension may vary independently from legitimacy. Leaders who do not hold positions of authority may or may not be covert. Thus legitimacy tells us nothing about "visibility", unless all leaders are public or organizational officers. Therefore, it would be possible to classify a leadership pool as "legitimate-invisible", etc. This dimension must also be viewed as falling on a continuum.

The extent to which a leadership pool is visible is associated with the distribution and exercise of power. Where the pool is "invisible", few constraints are placed upon the hidden power actors. These actors are relatively free to pursue their own interests. Furthermore, there are fewer avenues for redress open to the general citizenry than where the pool is "visible". Obviously, this variable is related to the degree of citizen participation in the leadership pool and to the general distribution of power. If the pool is "invisible", power is probably confined to a small number of actors, working covertly; i.e., an elite. Therefore, factors which would tend to hinder the development of an elite in a community would also tend to increase the visibility of the leadership pool.

Illustrative Propositions:

The greater the economic and government dependence (i.e., the less the autonomy) of the community on external sources, the less visible the leadership pool.

The greater the rate of population growth in the community, the less visible the leadership pool.

The more reformist the character of the local government in the community, the more visible the leadership pool.

The greater the organizational density in the community, the more visible the leadership pool.

The greater the economic diversity in the community, the more visible the leadership pool.

The higher the social class level of the community, the more visible the leadership pool.

We will be examining the relationship between the degree of visibility of the leadership pool and the pool's perception and definition of community problems. The degree of visibility would appear to affect the number of perceived problems, the degree of agreement among the power actors concerning the urgency of these problems, and the extent to which problems related to only one institutional area dominate the perception of the leadership pool. These issues will be discussed in more detail in the next section.

G. Scope of Influence

This dimension taps what is possibly the key issue in the debate between the "elitists" and the "pluralists". This dimension recognizes that one leader or a set of leaders may participate in decision making in a wide range of community issues, or different leaders or sets of leaders may be active in different areas. In one community the leadership pool may have "general overall influence" in various areas, such as the economic, political, educational, religious, and cultural institutions. In this case the scope of influence would be very broad, and a single pyramid might adequately describe the distribution of power. In another community, however, a division of labor may occur in which certain actors are influential in specific areas only. In this case, the pool has a narrow scope of influence. This latter situation exists due to differing bases of social power and access to power resources by the power actors, and is present where resources are decentralized and broadly distributed throughout the community.

The scope of influence of the leadership pool has obvious implications for the exercise of social power. Where the scope of influence is narrow, and the leadership pool is fractured with a number of "institutional-specific" influence pyramids, any problem or issue that cuts across institutional areas

will have to be attacked by means of exchange and the formation of coalitions among the power actors. Coordinated action and efficient output from such a leadership pool may become problematic. Of course, such a situation also is a strong indicator of a decentralized, pluralistic decision-making structure, and may therefore be viewed as being more responsive to overall community problems, not as motivated by strong vested interests, and more "controllable" by the general citizenry than a pool with broad scope.

Two generalizations emerge. First, it is highly unlikely that a leadership pool will be composed completely of general influence leaders. For such a situation to exist, every power actor would have to possess influence in every institutional area; with the distribution of power relevant resources in the community, this is not likely. No leadership pool exhibits the broadest possible scope of influence. Second, however, there are both specialized and general power actors in any leadership pool. Therefore, the question becomes one of degree; how broad is the scope of influence of one leadership pool in comparison to that of others.

From the literature and the model, it appears that those community structural variables which affect such variables as (1) the degree of structural differentiation in the system, (2) the distribution of power relevant resources, (3) the nature and quantity of power relevant resources available in the system, (4) the number of power actors in the system, etc., will influence the scope of power actors in the system, etc., will influence the scope of influence in the leadership pool. Any factors which increase the structural differentiation in the system, broaden the distribution of power-relevant resources, increase the quantity of issue-specific resources, increase the number of power actors, etc., would appear to narrow the scope of influence.

Illustrative Propositions:

The larger the population size of the community, the more narrow the scope of the leadership pool.

The greater the rate of population growth in the community, the more narrow the scope of the leadership pool.

The greater the demographic heterogeneity in the community, the more narrow the scope of the leadership pool.

The greater the economic and government dependence (i.e., the less the autonomy) of the community on external sources, the more narrow the scope of the leadership pool.

The greater the organizational density in the community, the more narrow the scope of the leadership pool.

The greater the economic diversity in the community, the more narrow the scope of the leadership pool.

The higher the social class level of the community, the more narrow the scope of the leadership pool.

The more reformist the character of the local government in the community, the more narrow the scope of the leadership pool.

H. Cohesiveness

Cohesiveness is the fourth dimension mentioned by Anton. The concept refers to the degree and nature of interaction among the power actors in the leadership pool. The actors may exhibit a high level of interaction, or they may be relatively isolated from each other. They may form one group, or be divided into cliques or fractions. The more cohesive the leadership pool, the smaller the number of clique and fractional patterns, and the higher the level of interaction among the power actors.

One would expect at least some interaction among the power actors. The exercise of power in general, and the process of handling issues and problems that cut across institutional areas in particular, necessitate it. If the power actors are to pool their resources, exchange vital resources, form coalitions to affect key decisions, etc., they must interact. What is crucial for the exercise of power, however, is the extent of cohesiveness within the leadership pool. Where there is high cohesion, coordinated activity is facilitated, the degree of consensus concerning emergning community issues and problems among the power actors is likely to be heightened, and the general output of the decision-making structure may be increased. On the other hand, where there is low cohesion, coordinated activity is problematic, consensus among the power actors may be low as each is involved in its own domain, and the level of outputs is likely to be relatively low.

Certain community structural variables would appear to affect the degree of cohesion within the leadership pool. Cohesion would tend to be lessened if the structure of the community isolates the power actors from one another, hinders their interaction, increases their number, and generally fragments the structure of the leadership pool. Structural variables that facilitate differentiation and cleavage within the local system would appear to be particularly relevant.

Illustrative Propositions:

The larger the population size of the community, the less cohesive the leadership pool.

The greater the rate of population growth in the community, the less cohesive the leadership pool.

The greater the demographic heterogeneity in the community, the less cohesive the leadership pool.

The greater the economic and government dependence (i.e., the less the autonomy) of the community on external sources, the less cohesive the leadership pool.

The more reformist the character of the local government in the local community, the less cohesive the leadership pool.

The greater the organizational density in the community, the less cohesive the leadership pool.

The greater the economic diversity in the community, the less cohesive the leadership pool.

The higher the social class level of the community, the less cohesive the leadership pool.

I. Entrenchment

The concept of entrenchment refers to the relative period of time that the power actors in the leadership pool have spent in the local community. The average number of years spent in the community is only a part of this concept. What is more crucial is the average proportion of the power actor's life that has been spent in the community. Such a proportion includes both the time spent within and outside the local area. For example, in one community the average power actor may have spent only 20 percent of his lifetime in the local community. On the other hand, in another community the power actors may have spent on the average 90 percent of their life in the local place. This latter leadership pool is more "entrenched" in the local system than the former one.

The degree of entrenchment in the leadership pool has implications for the distribution, structure, and exercise of power in the system. In a community in which the leadership is highly entrenched and the power actors have spent a great deal of their life in the local town, the structure of

decision making would tend to be stable. New actors with different values, goals, life styles, and resources would not be available to "shake up" the leadership pool. Certain of the bases of social power, particularly status, prestige, popularity, and social access to community leaders, might become more valuable and useful. There would probably be a higher level of cohesiveness and consensus on the part of the power actors, and the leadership pool's knowledge of, concern for, and personal identification with the community might be greater than in a low entrenched, highly mobile pool.

The literature provides no clues as to the nature of the association between the structural variables in the community and the degree of entrenchment in the leadership pool. The concept has not been presented previously in the power literature. It would appear, however, that any structural variable that would affect the level of in-migration, alter the local normative order, and generally influence the ability of new residents to enter the leadership pool would affect the degree of entrenchment. For example, where such variables as the rate of growth, local dependence, absentee-ownership, and dispersion of power-relevant resources are high, the leadership pool may be less entrenched, and the power actors more mobile.

Illustrative Propositions:

The larger the population size of the community, the less entrenched the leadership pool.

The greater the rate of population growth in the community, the less entrenched the leadership pool.

The greater the demographic heterogeneity in the community, the less entrenched the leadership pool.

The greater the economic and government dependence (i.e., the less the autonomy) of the community on external sources, the less entrenched the leadership pool.

The more reformist the character of the local government in the community, the less entrenched the leadership pool.

The greater the organizational density in the community, the less entrenched the leadership pool.

The greater the economic diversity in the community, the less entrenched the leadership pool.

The higher the social class level of the community, the less entrenched the leadership pool.

The dimension of entrenchment has also been included in the model because of its apparent relationship to the leadership pool's perception and definition of community problems. In communities with entrenched leadership pools one might expect greater consensus on both the perception and definition of problems, greater agreement concerning the urgency of the problems, a greater tendency to view the problems as unique, local concerns rather than manifestations of larger societal issues, a greater proclivity for defining the local community as the responsible agent for amelioration without outside help, etc. These associations will be explicated in the next section.

J. Cosmopolitanism-Localism

This final characteristic of the leadership pool has been selected mainly in order to investigate its effect upon community problem perception and definition. The distinction between cosmopolitanism and localism has often been utilized in social research. Merton has described a person who has a "localite" orientation as "parochial". His interests are confined to the local community. He is preoccupied with local problems to the virtual exclusion of the national and international scene.[10] A "cosmopolitan", on the other hand, may live in the local community, but he identifies and relates

himself to issues, events, and social organization in the broader national and international milieu.

The most extensive examination of this concept in relation to the distribution of power, however, was undertaken by Merton.[11] Merton used a form of the reputational technique to locate the leaders in Rovere. He then classified the leaders by their local and cosmopolitan orientation. The orientation did not refer to the arena in which the influentials were effective, but rather how each viewed the problems of the local community. Locals wished to establish frequent contacts with a great many people as a means to further their career while cosmopolitans desired quality. The locals belonged to voluntary organizations in order to make contacts and the cosmopolitans to organizations requiring special skills or knowledge. The locals held political posts while the cosmopolitans were more often on professional boards. The path to success for the localite was an elaborate network of personal relationships while the cosmopolitan was equipped with skills that furthered his upward mobility. Cosmopolitans were outsiders. The cosmopolitan was followed because he knew; the localite because he understood.

From the above studies we can infer that the degree of cosmopolitanism or localism in the leadership pool will be influenced by those structural variables which affect the autonomy, social class level, structural differentiation, and degree of political dominance in the community. Those communities that are economically and politically dependent upon the larger society, enjoy a relatively high social class level, have diversity within their demographic and economic bases, and have a reformist type of government with emphasis upon professionalism in the performance of political roles, are most likely to have cosmopolitan leadership pools. It must be noted, however, that the

leadership pool of any community will not be completely cosmopolitan. The power actors obviously are concerned with the condition within the local system. This system is the locus of power for these actors.

Illustrative Propositions:

The larger the population size of the community, the more cosmopolitan the leadership pool.

The greater the rate of population growth in the community, the more cosmopolitan the leadership pool.

The greater the demographic heterogeneity in the community, the more cosmopolitan the leadership pool.

The greater the economic and government dependence (i.e., the less the autonomy) of the community on external sources, the more cosmopolitan the leadership pool.

The more reformist the character of the local government in the community, the more cosmopolitan the leadership pool.

The greater the organizational density in the community, the less cosmopolitan the leadership pool.

The greater the economic diversity in the community, the more cosmopolitan the leadership pool.

The higher the social class level of the community, the more cosmopolitan the leadership pool.

As we noted, this variable has been specifically included in the model in order to examine its association with the leadership pool's perception and definition of problems. Such factors as the number of problems, their degree of uniqueness, the extent to which they are defined as solvable at the local level, and the degree of consensus regarding their urgency and importance

may be influenced by the orientation of the leadership pool along the cosmopolitan-localite continuum.

In this section we have presented our definition of the leadership pool and presented nine dimensions for classifying leadership pools. These pools can be classified by size, institutional dominance, social class level, legitimacy, visibility, scope of influence, cohesiveness, entrenchment, and cosmopolitan-local orientation. It is offered that classification along such variables is a needed refinement to the usual "elitist-pluralist" or "monolithic-polylithic" distinctions. Thus, we might have a small, economic, high social class, non-legitimate, invisible, general influence, cohesive, highly entrenched, localite pool in one community, as opposed to a large, economic-political, middle class, legitimate, visible, issue-specific, factional, non-entrenched, cosmopolitan leadership pool in another.

We also offered illustrative propositions relating the structure of the community to these characteristics of the leadership pool. Figure 2 presents in matrix form these propositions. The tentative nature of these propositions must be emphasized. They have been deductively drawn from the literature and the model. They await empirical validation.

Let us now turn to the third main dimension-set in our model -- community problem dimensions. In the next section we will present this dimension and relate its variables to the characteristics of the leadership pool. The final component of the model, i.e., patterns of community action, will be similarly treated in a subsequent section.

Figure 2

THE RELATIONSHIP OF COMMUNITY STRUCTURAL VARIABLES
TO THE CHARACTERISTICS OF THE LEADERSHIP POOL

Community Structural Variables	Characteristics of the Leadership Pool								
	Size	Prob. of Inst. Dom.	Social Class	Legit.	Visib.	Scope	Cohes.	Entren.	Cosmo-pol'sm
Size (Rate of Growth)	+	-	*	+	-	-	-	-	+
Demographic Heterogeneity	+	-	-	+	*	-	-	-	+
Dependence (Autonomy)	+	-	*	+	-	-	-	-	+
Political Dep.	+	+ (Econ Dom.)	*	-	-	- (Polit) + (Econ)	-	+	+
Economic Dept.	+	- (Polit Dom.)	*	+	-	- (Econ) + (Polit)	-	-	+
Reform Gov't.	+	*	+	+	+	-	-	-	+
Organizational Density	+	-	+	+	+	-	-	-	-
Diversity of the Economic Base	+	-	*	+	+	-	-	-	+
Social Class Level	+	-	+	+	+	-	-	-	*

+ = Positive Association; - = Negative Association; * = Direction of Relationship Not Known Prior to Empirical Examination.

The Model:
Community Problem Dimensions and Patterns of Community Action

In this section we will consider the final two dimension sets in the model: i.e., community problem dimensions and patterns of community action. As the reader may note, the first two sets of variables basically were structural in nature. They were concerned with the patterns of association between selected elements of the community and certain analytical dimensions of the community's pool of leadership. The dimensions in this chapter are more perceptual and social-psychological. We will be concerned with the power actors perception of problems, the analytical nature of their definition of problems, and the patterns inherent in the proposals they offer to ameliorate these problems.

Let us turn to the third dimension of our model.

Community Problem Dimensions

We are now about to enter virgin territory. In this section we will present a definition of community problems, offer seven analytical dimensions for classifying these problems based upon their perception and definition by the leadership pool, and relate these dimensions to the characteristics of the leadership pool. One of the working hypotheses of this model is that the structure and characteristics of the leadership pool will affect the pool's perception and definition of local problems. Such dimensions as the number of perceived problems, the degree of consensus shown by the power actors in defining the seriousness of the problems, the clarity of the definitions, and

the extent to which the perceived problems are institutionally specific will be affected by the scope, cohesiveness, class level, legitimacy, visibility, etc., of the leadership pool. Furthermore, it is proposed that the manner in which problems are perceived and defined will affect the types of action that are proposed for ameliorating them.

It was decided that the major criterion for the inclusion of a dimension was that it exhibit an apparent relationship with types of action that might be proposed to ameliorate the perceived problem. In other words, the attempt was made to include dimensions whose configurations would affect the nature of the action proposed by the leadership pool to solve the problem. Concern was evidenced in selecting dimensions that might affect such variables as the degree of urgency of the proposed action, the degree of coordination within the community required for implementing the proposal, and the degree of external aid needed in carrying out the proposed action. In addition, however, dimensions were sought which might be influenced by the characteristics of the leadership pool. To be included in the model, therefore, a dimension had to be able to serve a dual function. It had to be logically possible to view it as both a dependent (to the characteristics of the leadership pool) and an independent (to the proposed ameliorative action) variable.

These are stringent criteria. Certain dimensions were considered and not included because of a lack of fit with the other elements in the model. The attempt was made to select dimensions that could be applied to <u>any</u> perceived problem, and were not dependent upon the nature of any specific problem. For example, dimensions were chosen that could be applied to community problems as varied as juvenile delinquency, zoning, school finances, industrial development, sex education, local government taxation, slum

clearance, apathy, and water pollution. The task of selecting and justifying these dimensions would have been much easier if previous studies had analyzed the problem. As it is, the task is similar to attempting to construct a full score for an improvisational work by Bruin. One has an idea what types of elements to select to produce a coherent, logical, whole -- but there are no guidelines, classical conventions, or precedents to guide the endeavor. Mistakes may have been made. Therefore, this formulation must be viewed as tentative. It is hoped that even the heuristic application that this study represents will aid in refining the model.

The dimensions selected are (1) the number of perceived problems, (2) the perceived seriousness of the problems, (3) the degree of consensus concerning the seriousness of the problems in the community, (4) the extent of institutional specificity versus community generality inherent in the perceived problems, (5) the extent to which the perceived problems are viewed as solvable by the local community, (6) the degree of uniqueness of the problems, and (7) the degree of clarity in the definitions of the problems. These concepts will be defined and their place in the model explicated shortly. First, however, let us examine what we mean by community problems.

A. Definition

We shall define as community problems those CURRENT OR FUTURE CONDITIONS PERCEIVED TO BE PRESENT OR LIKELY TO OCCUR WITHIN THE COMMUNITY SOCIAL SYSTEM THAT ARE DEFINED BY POWER ACTORS IN THE LEADERSHIP POOL AS BEING DYSFUNCTIONAL AND REQUIRING AMELIORATION, WHETHER OR NOT THE CONDITION CAN BE AMELIORATED.

We begin our definition by stating that community problems are CURRENT OR FUTURE CONDITIONS PERCEIVED TO BE PRESENT OR LIKELY TO OCCUR IN THE COMMUNITY SOCIAL SYSTEM. The key word is perceived. The conditions we are

labeling as community problems are those that are perceived by the power actors as being currently present in the community or as having a high probability of future occurrence. Whether or not the condition is present objectively is of little importance. What is crucial is that the power actors perceived that it is, or soon may be. It is possible that the power actors may be chasing shadows and "looking for men under the bed." What they consider as being problems within the community may only exist in their perceptual set, influenced by what they view as their vested interests. (The fear expressed by a banker in a small midwestern town over a radical leftist takeover of the community by poisoning the citizens with fluoride in the water system may be such a "problem".) On the other hand, what the actors perceive as problems may be crucial needs, inconsistencies, contradictions, or deficiencies objectively present within the local community. Of course what is "objectively present" is always contingent upon one's criteria for selection, frame of reference, and location in the system; it may be impossible to determine the objective presence of <u>all</u> community problems with any degree of validity. There may be as many different problems as there are residents in the community! As we shall note below, what is important is that it is these perceived problems that will probably be attacked by the leadership pool. These are the conditions that will affect the nature of the pool's activity and the future of the system.

Perception, however, is not our only concern. We offer that these perceived conditions are those THAT ARE DEFINED BY POWER ACTORS IN THE LEADERSHIP POOL AS BEING DYSFUNCTIONAL AND REQUIRING AMELIORATION. To be considered a problem, therefore, a condition must meet two criteria. It must be defined by the power actors as being detrimental, pernicious, baneful, or deleterious to the community. In addition, however, it must be a condition that the actors define as requiring some measure of activity to solve. It

is possible that a condition may be viewed as dysfunctional but the power actors do not see it as requiring amelioration. Perhaps the issue is "not that bad". Perchance it is something "we have lived with so long that we're used to it". Possibly it is a situation that "those people brought on themselves -- they love to live that way, let's not bother them". By our definition, these conditions are not problems. They are not defined as requiring amelioration. Of course, it is possible for a problem to be defined as needing a solution, but subsequently no action may be taken by the power actors. This inactivity may be caused by numerous factors. It, however, is also important. The decision not to attempt to solve the problem, or not to initiate an ameliorative program <u>after</u> the condition has been defined as dysfunctional and requiring a solution, represents <u>action to undertake inaction</u>. The subsequently proposed activity, as we shall note shortly, is influenced by the nature of the problem definition. Conditions which meet these criteria, therefore, qualify as problems in our model.

Finally, we state WHETHER OR NOT THE CONDITION CAN BE AMELIORATED. It is possible that certain conditions may not be solvable, at least at the local level. Problems such as inflation and voting rights extension may be true concerns perceived as existing in the local community by the power actors. Solutions to such problems, however, do not lie at the local level. What this phrase highlights is that it may not be presently possible to solve all of the conditions that we might label as community problems. What is important, however, is that the power actors perceive the conditions as dysfunctional, and define these problems in such a manner that ameliorative action is viewed as being required.

Let us now turn to the community problem dimensions. Our modus operandi will be similar to that used in presenting the characteristics of the leadership pool, except that we will be unable to cite the previous work in the area.

B. The Number of Perceived Problems

The most obvious dimension for classifying the problems of the leadership pool is simply the number of different problems that power actors perceive as existing in the community. This dimension is important in that it indicates the actors' perception of "the state of the community," and may also serve as a measure of the perceived stress and strain in the local system. Obviously, one must be careful in using such a crude indicator in this manner. The actors (1) may not perceive many problems that are present (e.g., poverty in the hidden ghetto or pollution in the local stream), (2) may not acknowledge the existence of problems that are perceived by the general citizenry (e.g., a lack of effective community leadership), and/or (3) may perceive problems that are not actually existent in the community (e.g., a "Communist conspiracy"). What this dimension does tell us, however, is basically the number of different conditions present in the local community that the leadership pool views as being problematic. Where the number is large, one finds a leadership pool that is faced with such tasks as assigning priorities, allocating resources, coordinating action, and planning strategies to handle the volume of concerns; in this situation these tasks become problems in themselves. It may not be a question of "guns and butter", but the choice between "sewers and welfare" or "schools and low taxes" is just as difficult.

The number of perceived problems would appear to be affected by the characteristics of the leadership pool. Those characteristics of the leadership pool which affect such factors as the number of actors, the number of

contacts and channels that those in the leadership pool have with others in the system, the rate and nature of the information exchange with the pool, the scope of the leadership pool, etc., would also appear to influence the number of perceived problems. Any leadership pool that is large, visible, narrow in scope, factional, and generally associated with a wide, issue-specific distribution of power would tend to perceive a large number of different problems. Each power actor, relatively isolated from the other actors in the pool both with respect to the area of influence and the rate of interaction, would tend to perceive problems relevant to his institutional sphere. The larger the number of actors and the more widely distributed the decision-making structure, the larger the number of problems.

Illustrative Propositions:

The larger the size of the leadership pool, the larger the number of perceived problems.

The greater the dominance of one institution in the leadership pool, the smaller the number of perceived problems.

The higher the social class level of the leadership pool, the larger the number of perceived problems.

The more legitimate the leadership pool, the higher the number of perceived problems.

The more visible the leadership pool, the higher the number of perceived problems.

The broader the scope of the leadership pool, the smaller the number of perceived problems.

The more cohesive the leadership pool, the smaller the number of perceived problems.

The more entrenched the leadership pool, the larger the number of perceived problems.

We also consider this dimension as an independent variable which will affect the patterns of community action proposed by the leadership pool. We have already noted the attendant problems presented to the leadership pool by a large number of perceived problems. These concerns should be manifested in the proposals and tactics offered to ameliorate the problems. Such variables as the urgency, degree of coordination, amount of external aid, perceived relevance of institutions and organizations, etc., required for the successful implementation of the proposals would appear to be influenced by the number of perceived problems. We will further explicate these relationships in the final section of this chapter.

C. The Perceived Seriousness of the Problems

While the number of perceived problems is a useful dimension, this second dimension may be even more determinant of the patterns of ameliorative activity. Whether the perceived number of problems is large or small, the degree to which the power actors perceive and define them as serious will have ramifications for what, how, and particularly when they attempt to solve them. These first two dimensions are similar in many respects. Both may be utilized as indicators of the leadership pool's view of the welfare of the community at a given moment in time. Both create dilemmas, when their values increase, for the leadership pool concerning the assignment of priorities, the distribution of resources, etc. Also, both share the strengths and weaknesses that we have previously noted in being perceived by the leadership pool.

The two dimensions, however, are independent. It is possible to consider four types of communities based on the number and seriousness of the problems. The "deadly combination", of course, is a community in which the leadership pool perceives a high number of problems and defines them as serious. The

task facing such a pool by their own definition is monumental. In such a situation conflicts over priorities, resources, strategies, etc., are likely as there are many problems worthy of amelioration. Due to factors such as this, one might predict a low output, or low level of successful ameliorative action, as the leadership pool attempts to decide simply where to start! The high number-low seriousness and low number-high seriousness communities might prove to be interesting for future analysis. The former faces the same problems as the high number-high seriousness community -- without the sense of urgency. One might expect a leadership pool in such a condition to employ the tactic of "benign neglect". The latter, however, does not face the question of priority. It has few problems, but they are serious. They are visible. One might predict a fairly high output from such a leadership pool.

This dimension of seriousness was included in the model primarily for its utility as an independent variable. The perceived degree of seriousness, however, also would appear to be dependent upon the characteristics of the leadership pool. This dimension, though, is similar to the social class dimension in the previous section. The relationship between the characteristics of the leadership pool and the pool's perception of the seriousness of the community problems is not self-evident. Furthermore, there are no previous studies that provide clues as to the direction of such an association. In examining the relationship, however, it would appear that a cosmopolitan leadership pool would tend to view the problems of the community as less serious than a localist one. The power actors in the former are simply not that concerned with local issues. Conversely, an entrenched leadership pool may view the problems in the community as being serious. Such a pool is composed of power actors who have spent a large proportion of their lives in

the community, and have probably acquired a rather high degree of identification with the community. These high levels of familiarity and concern might result in seriously perceived problems. Furthermore, a narrow scoped, factional pool might also tend to perceive a high degree of severity inherent in the local problems. In such a pool, the power actors are isolated and hold and exercise influence in only one or a few institutional areas. Problems within these areas are salient to these actors. Issues within their spheres of influence are likely to be important to their vested interests. Therefore, such problems may be viewed as serious. Concommitantly, the perceived degree of severity inherent in the local problem definitions may be high.

These propositions are extremely tenuous and their explication may be considered as heuristic. They are offered at this time, however, in order that they may be empirically examined.

Illustrative Propositions:

The larger the size of the leadership pool, the less serious the perceived problems.

The greater the dominance of one institution in the leadership pool, the less serious the perceived problems.

The more visible the leadership pool, the more serious the perceived problems.

The more broad the scope of the leadership pool, the less serious the perceived problems.

The more cohesive the leadership pool, the less serious the perceived problems.

The more entrenched the leadership pool, the more serious the perceived problems.

The more cosmopolitan the leadership pool, the less serious the perceived problems.

This dimension would appear to be an antecedent determinant of the patterns of ameliorative action proposed by the leadership pool to solve the defined problems. The proposed immediacy of the action is one rather obvious dimension. Where problems are defined as serious, there is likely to be an associated sense of urgency about their solutions. Other characteristics of the proposed action, however, may also be affected by this dimension. The degree of required, institutional coordination within the community, the perceived relevance of various organizations, the possibility of one actor or a group of actors blocking the action, and the extent of external aid needed to solve the problem are a few examples. These relationships will be more fully discussed in the next section.

D. The Degree of Consensus Concerning the Perceived Problems in the Community

A crucial variable is the degree of consensus shown by the power actors concerning the existence and seriousness of the community problems. In some communities the power actors may exhibit a high degree of consensus about what constitutes the problems in the community. In other communities, however, conflict and disagreement may be found. In the latter situation effective ameliorative action is problematic. There is little agreement among the actors as to the nature of seriousness of the community's problems. Coordinated action within the leadership pool is difficult to achieve as the actors are faced with the tasks of assigning priorities, allocating resources, and planning strategies to solve the problems. Where the leadership pool evidences consensus regarding the problematic condition of the community, however, efforts at

successful solution and change are enhanced. Consensus basically serves to short-cut the process from perception to implementation. Where there is consensus within the leadership pool concerning the seriousness of the community's problems, the pool can more easily institute the types of action they perceive as necessary to ameliorate the situation. Some of the most violent, rancorous conflicts local communities experience are centered about this dimension of consensus. Schools or low taxes, which shall it be? Questions such as this must be answered before the leadership can have either choice.

The degree of consensus would appear to be influenced strongly by the characteristics of the leadership pool. If the leadership pool is large, factional, visible, not dominated by a single institution, and cosmopolitan in orientation, the degree of consensus will probably be low. In such a pool the power actors are isolated individually or in groups. There is little interaction between them; little opportunity to converse and reach consensus. Where they are visible, the pool receives many varied inputs about community problems. Selecting those which are valid, urgent concerns and having the power actors agree with such a selection may be difficult. A cosmopolitan leadership pool may not reach consensus because of the relatively lower degree of identification with and interest in the local community. Finally, a pool with a narrow scope of influence would probably have a low degree of consensus. The power actors have influence within limited institutional areas. They will tend to perceive problems as serious within their areas. In such a situation, based upon the vested interests of each actor in a particular segment of the community, consensus regarding the seriousness of the overall problems in the community will be low.

Illustrative Propositions:

The larger the size of the leadership pool, the lower the level of consensus concerning the perceived problems.

The greater the dominance of one institution in the leadership pool, the higher the level of consensus concerning the perceived problems.

The more legitimate the leadership pool, the lower the level of consensus concerning the perceived problems.

The more visible the leadership pool, the lower the level of consensus concerning the perceived problems.

The broader the scope of the leadership pool, the higher the level of consensus concerning the perceived problems.

The more cohesive the leadership pool, the higher the level of consensus concerning the perceived problems.

The more entrenched the leadership pool, the higher the level of consensus concerning the perceived problems.

The more cosmopolitan the leadership pool, the lower the level of consensus concerning the perceived problems.

We have already noted the effect upon coordinated action that this dimension may exhibit. Other characteristics of the ameliorative proposals may also be affected. The perceived urgency of instituting action aimed at changing the situation, the perceived possibility of various interest groups blocking the action, and the perceived relevance of various organizations for a successful implementation of the program are other dependent characteristics. Basically, a lack of consensus about the problems in the community may produce a lack of agreement about what is to be done to correct these conditions. Such a situation may lead to a high degree of ambiguity and <u>inaction</u>. Other questions

may also be influenced by the level of consensus. Should action be the responsibility of the government or private interests? Should external aid be sought by the local community to solve the problems? Who should initiate the action? We will explicate these relationships in greater detail in the next section.

E. Institutional Specificity versus Community Generality

This community problem dimension may be the most important in our model. Some power actors may be myopic when perceiving community problems. These actors tend only to perceive and define problems that are related to their own institutional spheres. In such leadership pools, one finds governmental officials citing only governmentally related problems; public school administrators only perceiving educational issues; and the industrial leaders viewing as problematical only those conditions which affect the industrial sector of the community. The leadership pool in such a community may be labeled as "institutionally specific" in its perception of local problems. Other power actors may have a panoramic view of the community. The conditions they perceive as being problematic may be in institutional areas other than their own sphere, and may have community wide implications. The city auditor may view school financing as an urgent problem; the school superintendent may be concerned with urban renewal; the industrialist may perceive that there is a great need for increased hospital facilities in the community. If the leadership pool is composed of actors with such a perspective, it may be labeled as exhibiting "community generality" in its perception. Community leadership pools can be placed on a continuum based upon this dimension, with polar extremes being "specificity" and "generality".

The importance of this dimension lies in its relationship with the other community problem dimensions. Such dimensions as consensus, the number of problems, the degree of seriousness, and the possibility of local solution may be influenced by this dimension. For example, where the perceived problems exhibit institutional specificity, the level of consensus will probably be low. Each actor sees problems only related to his sphere of activity. As the overall perception of problems becomes fragmented, the level of agreement becomes low. Such interrelationships between the community problem dimensions, however, must be empirically examined.

Whether or not the perceived problems are institutionally specific or of general community orientation would appear to be strongly influenced by the characteristics of the leadership pool. No set of perceived problems would ever be completely specific or general in orientation. Some specificity is to be expected due to the vested interests of power actors who do not possess a broad scope of influence. Also, a degree of generality is likely to occur because of the visibility of certain issues, and the existence of actors with higher levels of general influence in the community. It would appear, however, that leadership pools characterized by large size, institutional dominance, high legitimacy, high visibility, narrow scope of influence, low cohesiveness, low entrenchment, and a cosmopolitan orientation would tend to perceive and define problems that were specific to various institutions. This institutional specificity would likely occur from the fractionated, pluralistic, polythic nature of such a leadership pool. Where the power actors exercise influence in a specific institutional sphere, and the leadership pool is clique-ridden and factional, the actors have less opportunity to become aware of and knowledgeable about problems in other areas. Furthermore, the actors'

interests are so deeply embedded in a specific institutional sphere that it is not surprising that it should serve as the locus of the problems they perceive as being urgent. Basically, any characteristic of the leadership pool which would tend to focus and limit the power actors' influence and activity to a specific institutional area, would also tend to increase the institutional specificity of the perceived problems. In such a leadership pool, "myopia" may be a common condition.

Illustrative Propositions:

The larger the size of the leadership pool, the greater the degree of institutional specificity in the perceived problems.

The greater the dominance of one institution in the leadership pool, the greater the degree of institutional specificity in the perceived problems.

The higher the social class level of the leadership pool, the lesser the degree of institutional specificity in the perceived problems.

The more legitimate the leadership pool, the greater the degree of institutional specificity in the perceived problems.

The more visible the leadership pool, the greater the degree of institutional specificity in the perceived problems.

The broader the scope of influence of the leadership pool, the lesser the degree of institutional specificity in the perceived problems.

The more cohesive the leadership pool, the lesser the degree of institutional specificity in the perceived problems.

The more entrenched the leadership pool, the lesser the degree of institutional specificity in the perceived problems.

The more cosmopolitan the leadership pool, the greater the degree of institutional specificity in the perceived problems.

This dimension also has particular relevance as an independent variable. The degree of institutional specificity would appear to influence various patterns of the proposed ameliorative activity. Where the perceived problems are located within specific institutional spheres, the level of consensus within the leadership pool probably will be lessened. Furthermore, the tasks of establishing priorities, allocating resources, and instituting ameliorative action will become more difficult. In such a situation, conflict is likely. Reconciliation is difficult, and inactivity may result. Also, such variables as the level of required coordination among the various institutions to successfully implement the proposals would appear to be affected. As a general proposition one might offer that the more institutionally specific the perceived problems, the greater the difficulty in successfully implementing the proposed action.

F. The Possibility of Local Solution

Certain problems may be defined by the leadership pool as being solvable at the local level -- by the local community. The power actors believe that these types of problems are the responsibility of the local community; not non-local state, regional, or national agencies. Furthermore, it is perceived that the local community possesses the necessary material resources, skills, and knowledge to undertake a solution. Such problems as downtown traffic congestion, zoning, school curriculum reform, integration of public facilities, and the extension of sewer and water lines are examples of types of problems for which there may be purely local solutions. On the other hand, a local solution may be defined as impossible. Certain problems, although existent within the community, may not be considered as the community's responsibility. Furthermore, the nature of other problems may be such that the leadership pool

does not believe that the local community, by itself, has the ability to solve them. The community is defined as lacking the requisite authority, resources, skills, or knowledge. The solution to such problems lies either totally outside the local community, or within the local community, but requires extensive external aid. Examples of such problems might include inflation, urban renewal, school construction, long-range planning, industrial development, hospital construction, and poverty and unemployment. In effect, this variable provides an indicator of the perceived "problem solving" ability of the local community.

The degree to which problems are defined as being solvable at the local level would appear to be related to certain characteristics of the leadership pool. Those characteristics which would tend to limit the power actor's knowledge about the total resources available in the community and/or increase his knowledge about the possible external sources of aid available to the community apparently would have particular relevance. Both of these conditions should increase external aid. Such characteristics, therefore, as the degree of cosmopolitanism, the level of cohesiveness, the extent of entrenchment, and the scope of influence within the leadership pool should become manifest as important antecedent determinants. The relationship, however, of other characteristics, such as the degree of visibility and institutional dominance, is not clear. The existence and direction of such associations cannot be determined prior to the empirical application of the model. Once again, the following propositions must be considered as illustrative and highly tentative.

Illustrative Propositions:

The higher the social class level of the leadership pool, the lower the proportion of locally solvable problems.

The broader the scope of influence in the leadership pool, the higher the proportion of locally solvable problems.

The more cohesive the leadership pool, the higher the proportion of locally solvable problems.

The more entrenched the leadership pool, the higher the proportion of locally solvable problems.

The more cosmopolitan the leadership pool, the lower the proportion of locally solvable problems.

Various characteristics of the proposed ameliorative action would appear to be influenced by this dimension. In fact, this dimension may be the most crucial antecedent determinant. Obviously, the level of inactivity will be affected. The extent to which the leadership pool defines and proposes "no action" as possible, should be influenced by this definitional dimension. Where the local community is not defined as the viable locus for solution, the degree of inactivity will likely increase. Other action patterns, however, would also appear to be affected. The association with the proposed degree of external aid considered essential to solve the problem is practically tautological. The perceived relevance of local organizations and the possibility of blockage by local individuals and groups also would appear to be negatively associated with the degree of local solution. Also, the perceived extent of governmental as opposed to private responsibility would appear to be influenced by this dimension. We will further explicate the associations in the next chapter.

G. The Degree of Uniqueness in the Problem Definitions

Leadership pools may vary in the extent to which they define local community problems as being unique to their community, as opposed to neighboring

or similar communities. Some pools may define their problems as unique. Others may view them as similar to those faced by other, salient communities. Certain conditions, such as a lack of industrial development, needed zoning reform, or the need for the construction of a flood wall may be truly idiosyncratic to the community. Other issues, such as crime and delinquency, adequate governmental financing, and school construction are likely to be present in other communities. The important variable, however, is the extent to which the leadership pool perceives the problems as being unique -- whether or not they actually are. In communities with a high degree of uniquely defined problems, one can expect the leadership pool to look within the community both for causal factors and for ameliorative action. If there is something "uniquely wrong" within the community, less reliance might be placed upon the aid, experience, and knowledge of external sources.

The structure of leadership in the community would appear to influence the defined degree of uniqueness in the community problems. The social class level and degree of cosmopolitanism are characteristics of the leadership pool that should influence the extent of uniqueness. Educational level is an important indicator of social class level. This variable, and cosmopolitanism, might serve to broaden the interests and knowledge of the leadership pool. A leadership pool characterized by high social class and a cosmopolitan orientation, therefore, might tend to define proportionately fewer problems as being unique to the local community. Entrenchment apparently represents another crucial determinant. Where the power actors in a leadership pool have spent a large proportion of their life within the local community, they may be less knowledgeable about the conditions in otherareas. If they exhibit a strong personal identification with the local area, they might be expected to define

its problems as being unique. The relationships between uniqueness and the other characteristics of the leadership pool lack face validity. The only clue to the association might be found in the possible interrelatedness of certain of the characteristics. If entrenchment, broad scope of influence, and high cohesiveness are positively associated, then these latter characteristics also may increase the degree of uniqueness. This statement represents, however, pure speculation. These associations and interrelationships have never before been conceptually posed or empirically examined.

Illustrative Propositions:

The larger the size of the leadership pool, the less unique the perceived problems.

The broader the scope of the leadership pool, the more unique the perceived problems.

The more cohesive the leadership pool, the more unique the perceived problems.

The more entrenched the leadership pool, the more unique the perceived problems.

The higher the social class level of the leadership pool, the less unique the perceived problems.

The more cosmopolitan the leadership pool, the less unique the perceived problems.

As an independent variable, this dimension would appear to have utility for explaining certain characteristics of the proposed ameliorative action. We might assume that the most crucial dependent characteristic would be the locus of action. If the community problems are defined as unique, there may be a greater tendency to attempt to solve them within the local community,

without reliance on outside sources of aid. The perceived relevance of local organizations, the degree of urgency in implementing an action program, and the level of inactivity are other examples of possible dependent characteristics.

H. The Clarity of the Problem Definitions

The set of problems perceived by the leadership pool may vary in the degree of clarity exhibited in their definitions. By clarity, we are referring to the extent to which they are viewed in specific cause and effect terms. Certain problems may be defined as having single or multiple specific "causes". The "cause" of water pollution in the local river may be the dumping of waste materials into the stream by the local rendering plant. The "cause" of an inadequate sewage system may be the refusal of the city council to appropriate the needed funds. The "causes" of local racial discontent may be "the segregated municipal swimming pool and the discriminatory hiring practices in the local plants". In defining these problems, the power actors in the leadership pool offer concrete, specific, factors as being the causes of the problems. In their definitions, they exhibit a belief in specifically what conditions are bringing about the problems. Furthermore, in so doing they specify what conditions in the community must be altered to ameliorate the problems. Other problems, however, may be defined as having "no cause", or causal relationships may be proposed in highly amorphous, abstract, and general terminology. In these definitions the power actors are not able to pinpoint "causes", or attribute cause to such general conditions as "apathy", "growth", or "the sexual revolution". In the former instance, there exists a fairly direct association within the power actor's definition between the specific cause and the problematic effect. In the latter situation, the association is much less direct; several intervening factors and relationships seem to be missing. An

example of such a general, causal imputation would be positing "basic human nature" as the cause of urban blight.

The degree of clarity in the leadership pool's definitions would appear to be influenced by various characteristics of the pool. Once again, we find that those characteristics which indicate greater knowledge of, interest in, and identification with the community are particularly important. The social class level, degree of cosmopolitanism, and level of entrenchment are such characteristics. A leadership pool with high social status and a high level of entrenchment might be expected to offer a higher proportion of clearly defined problems. If the pool is extremely cosmopolitan, however, and has little interest in the local community (a rather unlikely occurrence) the proportion might be lower. In addition, the characteristic of visibility would appear to be positively associated with the proportion of clearly defined problems. A visible leadership pool is a target. Individuals and groups with problematic concerns or "beefs" can identify whom to contact to "have something done". Because of these sources of information, a visible pool may be more knowledgeable about the conditions in the local system than a covert one. Increased knowledge may be manifested in clearer definitions. Likewise, a high level of cohesiveness facilitates the exchange of information and opinion among the power actors. Serving as another source of information, it may also be positively associated with our dependent dimension. Due to a lack of previous conceptualization or empirical study within this area, we must, however, emphasize the tentative nature of the following illustrative propositions.

Illustrative Propositions:

The larger the size of the leadership pool, the lower the proportion of clearly defined problems.

The higher the social class level of the leadership pool, thehigher the proportion of clearly defined problems.

The more visible the leadership pool, the higher the proportion of clearly defined problems.

The broader the scope of the leadership pool, the higher the proportion of clearly defined problems.

The more cohesive the leadership pool, the higher the proportion of clearly defined problems.

The more entrenched the leadership pool, the higher the proportion of clearly defined problems.

The more cosmopolitan the leadership pool, the higher the proportion of clearly defined problems.

This dimension would appear to affect the likelihood of <u>any</u> action being proposed to ameliorate the defined problem. If the leadership pool is unable to impute a causal association, or where the causal association offered is abstract and amorphous, the level of inactivity might be expected to be high. If the leadership pool defines a specific cause to a problem, it seems probable that they would be <u>more</u> likely to propose such a causal association. In the former situation, the leadership pool, <u>by their own definitions</u>, has isolated contributory factors to the problematic condition. Offering proposals for ameliorative action would appear to be facilitated by the existence of visible, specific targets for change. Other patterns of proposed action, such as the relevance of local organizations for successful implementation and the perceived threat of blockage, might also be influenced by the degree of clarity within the definitions.

In this section we have presented seven community problem dimensions. These dimensions include: (1) the number of perceived problems, (2) the perceived seriousness of the problems, (3) the degree of consensus concerning the perceived problems, (4) the degree of institutional specificity versus community generality evidenced in the perception of the problem, (5) the defined possibility of local solution, (6) the degree of uniqueness in the problem definitions, and (7) the clarity of the problem definitions. These dimensions were defined, explicated, related as dependent variables to the characteristics of the leadership pool, justified for inclusion as independent variables of the patterns of ameliorative action. The perceived problems of any leadership pool can be classified along these dimensions. Thus a "problem set" may be classified as large, not serious, of low consensus, institutionally specific, not solvable at the local level, not unique, and not clearly defined -- or any other combination of the above dimensions. These dimensions are tentatively proposed. Empirical application will determine their utility.

Figure 3 represents a matrix presentation of the proposed relationships between the characteristics of the leadership and the community problem dimensions. These propositions are highly tentative and heuristic. They await empirical validation.

Finally, we must note the possibility of covariance between these community problem dimensions. All of our "dimension sets" may covary. The level of covariance is an empirical issue.

Patterns of Community Action

The last section of our model relates to the action proposed by the leadership pool to ameliorate their perceived problems. This final set of

Figure 3

THE RELATIONSHIP OF THE CHARACTERISTICS OF THE LEADERSHIP POOL TO THE COMMUNITY PROBLEM DIMENSIONS

Characteristics of the Leadership Pool	Community Problem Dimensions						
	Number	Seriousness	Consensus	Institu'l Specificity	Local Solvability	Uniqueness	Clarity of Def.
Size	+	-	-	+	-	-	-
Institut'l Dominance	-	-	+	+	*	*	+
Social Class Level	+	*	*	-	-	-	+
Legitimacy	+	+	-	+	*	*	*
Visibility	+	+	-	+	*	*	+
Scope	-	-	+	-	+	+	+
Cohesiveness	-	-	+	-	+	+	+
Entrenchment	+	+	+	-	+	+	+
Cosmopolitanism	-	-	-	+	-	-	-

+ = Positive Association; - = Negative Association; * = Direction of Relationship Not Known Prior to Empirical Examination.

variables is very important. It truly indicates "where the action is!" We will offer seven variable patterns or characteristics for classifying this action. This set has theoretical importance. It is the final element in our processual model. The characteristics of the proposed action would appear to be strongly influenced by the perception and definition of community problems by the leadership pool. Furthermore, one can surmise that the patterns taken by this action will affect the structure of the community. For example, let us suppose that the leadership pool proposes that a large amount of non-local, external aid in the form of resources, skill and knowledge, or authorization is required to ameliorate the local problems. The degree of local community autonomy may be lowered if such a proposal is undertaken. These patterns of action, therefore, are intimately related to change within the system. They are offered to alter conditions within the system.

These characteristics also have practical importance. If an actor wants to institute ameliorative action or social change within the system, the classification of proposals and explication of their associations with the leadership pool's perception and definition of problems should prove to be relevant and valuable. A better understanding of certain key dimensions of community action proposals should aid the actor in instituting purposeful social change.

In selecting these patterns, we faced the same problems that were noted in the selection of the community problem dimensions. Practically no previous conceptual or empirical studies have attempted to develop action patterns, let alone examine their relationships to the perception and definition of local problems.

In selecting the action patterns we first sought variables that would tap crucial elements of any proposed action. Crucial elements were defined

as those which appeared relevant to the involvement of local units in the proposed activity. Such dimensions as the extent of required coordination among local institutions, the relevance of local organizations, the perceived possibility of one or a few actors "blocking" or defeating the proposals, etc., fulfilled this requirement. Second, we attempted to include variables that would be as encompassing of as many aspects of community action as possible. Finally, the variables had to be at a level of generality and abstractness that they could be applied to <u>any</u> proposed ameliorative action. Our patterns of community action can be applied to such varied proposals and projects as the "bussing" of students to achieve racial balance in the schools, the development of an industrial park, the floating of a school bond issue, the recruitment of public servants, the restructuring of the local government, the construction of a floodwall, the renovation of the downtown business district, the building of single family rental units, or the assassination of the mayor.

The seven patterns of community action include: (1) the urgency or immediacy of instituting the proposals, (2) the degree of institutional coordination required to successfully implement the program, (3) the degree of public versus private responsibility for action, (4) the perceived relevance of local organizations, (5) the proposed degree of external, non-local involvement in the ameliorative action, (6) the perceived possibility of "blockage" by one or a few actors, and (7) the level of inactivity. In this section we will define these variables, explicate their relevance to the model, relate them to the perception and definition of local problems, and suggest possible operational indicators for their measurement.

Before considering these specific patterns, however, let us define and briefly explicate the nature of our general concept, i.e., community action.

A. Definition

We shall define community action as those ACTIVITIES OR INACTIVITIES THAT ARE PROPOSED BY THE LEADERSHIP POOL, REQUIRE LOCAL COMMUNITY INVOLVEMENT, AND ARE OFFERED TO AMELIORATE PERCEIVED COMMUNITY PROBLEMS AND THEREBY AFFECT THE STRUCTURE AND PROCESSES IN THE SYSTEM.

Our definition begins by labeling as community action those ACTIVITIES OR INACTIVITIES THAT ARE PROPOSED BY THE LEADERSHIP POOL. An obvious, logical question is "why include inactivity in a discussion of community action?" There may be occasions when power actors in the leadership pool propose a "do nothing" policy to "solve" certain problems. There are numerous situations in which the power actors may propose "inactivity" as the most appropriate action. A power actor may perceive and define a problem as existing within the community, but it is not yet a public issue. If public disclosure and subsequent ameliorative action are defined by the power actor as being opposed to his "best interests," inactivity may be an attractive proposal. Political graft and corruption on the part of local political officials, discriminatory hiring practices by local unions, price fixing and collusion by local businessmen, and the pollution of the local waterways by the community's industries are a few examples of such types of problems. Often the power actors seem to be saying, "let's do nothing, maybe nobody will notice, and eventually the problem will 'solve' itself. Above all, let's not get hurt!" Such proposals have implications for the future structure and processes in the community, and thereby qualify as action in our model.

Other situations may also lead, however, to the proposal of inactivity. Certain issues may be defined by the power actors as problems, but they are

too "hot," too controversial. Local segregation practices, fluoridation of the water system, and the institution of a city income tax may represent such issues. The power actors do define these conditions as local problems. Due to a number of factors, however (not the least of which may be their vested interests in the community system), they propose inactivity to "solve" them. Such comments as "The time is not right, maybe in a year or so we will be ready to tackle that one," or "Yes, it's a bad situation, but there is no use in creating a bloody fight within this town, besides it will probably iron itself out," are often presented to justify the proposed inactivity. Of course, the power actors may believe that a condition is problematic, but that "benign neglect" is the best policy. Placing their faith in the "benovolence of evolution," these actors basically propose that "time will heal all wounds."

Proposals of inactivity occur at all levels, within all systems. They appear most likely to occur when other forms of action are defined by the power actors as detrimental to their vested interests. Whether it be a "suggestion" offered by a presidential advisor, or a "stalling tactic" by the president of the local chemical company, inactivity is a proposal that can influence the system. We will consider such a proposal as a form of community action.

To be considered as community action, however, a proposed ameliorative program must REQUIRE LOCAL COMMUNITY INVOLVEMENT. Certain proposals may require action exclusively within and by the local community and its institutions. The institution of a one-way street system to relieve downtown congestion may be such a problem. Other community action may be sanctioned, funded, developed, and accomplished predominately by external, non-local

agents. In certain instances an entire program from conception to conclusion may be controlled by non-local units. The locating and building of an interstate highway on the periphery of the community may be such an act. To be considered as community action, however, the activity must (1) have its ultimate locus of change within the community system, and (2) require at least some involvement by the local community actors. For example let us return to our illustration of the interstate highway. It is possible that the local leadership pool defined "geographic isolation" and inadequate long-distance highways as a community problem. As at least a partial solution, they may have proposed the building of a modern highway. Due to the cost of construction, a lack of knowledge, experience, and local authority, etc., this ameliorative action could not obviously be undertaken alone by the local community. As a solution, therefore, the power actors may have lobbied and attempted to influence the outside agencies to locate the highway near the community and provide an interchange for local use. Such activity would be classified as community action, because it included local involvement. On the other hand, the local actors may have suddenly found out that an interstate highway was going to be constructed near their community. The local actors may have taken no action to influence this construction. Furthermore, they may never have perceived any reaction or involvement as necessary. In this instance, this construction would not be classified as community action.

Finally, we note that these community actions ARE OFFERED TO AMELIORATE PERCEIVED COMMUNITY PROBLEMS AND THEREBY AFFECT THE STRUCTURE AND PROCESSES IN THE SYSTEM. Briefly, there are two points to emphasize in these phrases. First, what we are defining as community actions are those proposed activities that are related to the power actors' perceived and defined problems. For

the purposes of our model, these are the relevant activities. They are "problem-linked." Second, we are asserting that these ameliorative actions are intimately related to the process of social change within the community. These actions are aimed at altering the existing conditions in the community; they are agents of social change.

Let us now turn to our seven patterns of action. These dimensions will be defined, explicated, and related to the community problem dimensions.

B. The Urgency or Immediacy of Instituting the Ameliorative Action

Among the possible patterns of variation among action proposals is the perceived urgency or immediacy of implementing them. Certain problems may require immediate action. Conditions posing extreme stress on the local community in general, and those that exhibit a rapid onset and are diffuse throughout the community in particular, are these types of problems. The most urgent action is required to contend with conditions that are defined by the power actors as "disastrous." A natural disaster or civil disturbance obviously requires urgent, immediate ameliorative activity. Other conditions, however, though less dramatic, may be equally in need of an urgent solution. It would appear that those conditions which are perceived to (1) manifestly threaten life, property, and/or community values and mores, or (2) greatly disturb the normal conditions in the local system, or (3) directly threaten the vested interests of the power actors, would be urgently attacked. The emergency passage of a bond issue to "keep the schools open," the securing of a restraining order to halt a wildcat strike, the enactment of emergency resolutions to repair a weakened water system, a special recall election to remove corrupt officials, and the effort to attract new industry to ease a

crucial problem of unemployment caused by the loss of the community's major industrial plant, may be examples of urgent action. Other types of action, however, may not have to be immediately undertaken. Certain conditions may be perceived and defined by the power actors as problems, however they do not meet the above criteria and therefore a solution is not proposed as being urgently needed. Efforts to promote "culture" within the community, the construction of a neighborhood park, or the development of a master plan are a few examples.

The degree of urgency inherent in the ameliorative action is a crucial variable. Where the need for action is immediate, stress is placed upon those actors and organizations defined as relevant and responsible for the activity. With a demand to "do something -- now!" such relevant units must develop plans and tactics, procure requisite resources, coordinate activity, and perform other needed tasks under duress. The possibility of successful implementation obviously is influenced by this dimension.

Some might propose that the nature of the problematic condition determines the degree of urgency in the ameliorative action. It would appear, however, that the degree of urgency is influenced by the perception and definition of the problems by the leadership pool -- not anything inherent in the problem itself. The same condition may be proposed as requiring immediate action in one community, while in another it is not defined as urgent. What is crucial is how the problem is defined. The degree of seriousness perceived in the problem is an obvious determinant of the degree of urgency in the solution. The more serious the perceived set of problems, the more urgent the proposed solutions. Other community problem dimensions, however, would also appear to be associated with the degree of urgency. If a large number of different

problems are perceived, the degree of overall urgency might be expected to be low. In such communities, there are few "overriding," paramount problems. The degree of institutional specificity might be assumed to be positively associated with the degree of urgency. Issues centered within the power actor's sphere of influence are likely to be seen as urgent. Problems, however, which are clearly defined and unique may be positively associated with the proposed immediacy of the ameliorative action. Where the problems are not defined in specific cause and effect terms, the implementation of immediate action is difficult. Furthermore, the more unique the problems, the more urgent the action. Routine problematic conditions, those found in most communities, may be handled through time by institutional means. It is the condition that is defined as unique that may require immediate attention.

We must note that the above discussion of proposed associations is based upon studied thought and the general deductive scheme inherent in the model. The discussion assumes a degree of covariance among the community problem dimensions. There is a dearth of theoretical or empirical studies to guide the exposition of such associations. In certain instances, the existence and direction of the assumed association cannot be predicted prior to empirical examination. Therefore, the following list of propositions may be viewed as heuristic. They are offered to stimulate thought and to allow for empirical examination.

Illustrative Propositions:

The larger the number of perceived problems, the less urgent the proposed ameliorative action.

The more serious the perceived problems, the more urgent the proposed ameliorative action.

The greater the institutional specificity in the perceived problems, the more urgent the proposed ameliorative action.

The more unique the perceived problems, the more urgent the proposed ameliorative action.

The higher the proportion of clearly defined problems, the more urgent the proposed ameliorative action.

C. The Degree of Institutional Coordination Required to Successfully Implement the Proposed Ameliorative Action

An important characteristic of action proposals is the degree to which they require coordination among the various institutions in the community. Certain problems may be solved by action located within only a single institution. Other sub-units in the community system may not be defined as being relevant or responsible actors. These proposals, while offered by the power actors to ameliorate conditions they have perceived and defined as "community" problems, are actually "business," "industry," "government," or "school" concerns. Other proposals, however, may require the involvement and coordinated activity of two, three, or more institutional areas. Certain patterns of community action may come close to involving the total community. For example, in one community the action proposed to rebuild the downtown area required the involvement of over six different institutional spheres. Business, industry, government, mass media, and the financial sectors, as one might expect, were involved. In addition, the local school system and college were also participants. Such an action program requires a great deal of coordination among the community sub-units. Its implementation presents different problems to those attempting institute change than a program that is the responsibility of "business" or "the schools."

This characteristic has utility for action analysis because it represents a crucial determinant of successful implementation. To a certain extent, this characteristic is an indicator of the complexity of the issue. When the local government can develop and initiate the action, secure the necessary human and material resources for its implementation, and perform all the requisite tasks from the point of problem recognition to the stage of problem solution, the action can be viewed as less complex than when other institutional areas in the community must also participate. As different institutional areas become involved, coordination among these actors becomes more problematic. The "horizontal" network within the community is "put to the test." The true, functional viability of the local community comes under examination. As more elements of the horizontal network become active participants in the action, the tasks of securing cooperation among the actors, developing consensus regarding priorities, establishing tactics and strategies, allocating tasks and roles to the participants, procuring and distributing resources, implementing and coordinating the activity, and dividing the rewards and sanctions (i.e., who gets the credit, and/or who gets blamed?") become more difficult. One might propose, therefore, that the degree of institutional coordination is negatively associated with the probability of successful implementation.

The degree of institutional coordination inherent in any instance of community action proposed by the power actors would appear to be strongly influenced by their perception and definition of community problems. Such community problem dimensions as the perceived seriousness of the problems, the degree of consensus concerning the nature and severity of the problems, the perceived possibility of local solution, the degree of uniqueness, and

the clarity of the definitions might be positively associated with the degree of institutional coordination in the proposed ameliorative action. Although severe problems may be ameliorated by the action of a single institution, where the percentage of problems perceived as severe is high, coordinated activity is likely to be proposed. Similarly, where there is a high degree of consensus on the severity of the problem set, coordinated activity is probable, as representatives of the different institutional areas in the leadership pool illustrate a margin of agreement about what problems should be attacked. If the problems are clearly defined, viewed as unique, but perceived as solvable by the local community, the power actors may propose a more massive program to solve them. Such a program may require greater institutional coordination. Obviously, however, the degree of institutional specificity inherent in the problem definitions would appear to be negatively associated with this action characteristic.

Illustrative Propositions:

The more serious the perceived problems, the greater the degree of institutional coordination inherent in the proposed ameliorative action.

The higher the level of consensus concerning the perceived problems, the greater the degree of institutional coordination inherent in the proposed ameliorative action.

The greater the institutional specificity in the perceived problems, the lesser the degree of institutional coordination inherent in the proposed ameliorative action.

The higher the proportion of locally solvable problems, the greater the degree of institutional coordination inherent in the proposed ameliorative action.

The more unique the perceived problems, the greater the degree of institutional coordination inherent in the proposed ameliorative action.

The higher the proportion of clearly defined problems, the greater the degree of institutional coordination inherent in the proposed ameliorative action.

The degree of institutional coordination defined as requisite by the power actors can be indicated by determining hich institutions they perceived as being relevant and responsible for solving their problems.

D. The Degree of Public versus Private Responsibility for Action

Proposals for ameliorative community action may differ with respect to the degree to which the power actors define them as "public" (i.e., governmentally as opposed to "private" concerns). The solution to certain problems may be defined as purely a governmental concern. Other problems, however, may be considered by the power actors as conditions requiring action by "private" citizens. The extent of defined "public," governmental responsibility for community action would appear to be an important characteristic of any community's action set.

This characteristic of the community's horizontal pattern is especially relevant to our model. This model is offered to be utilized in the comparative examination of community power. One of the central issues of debate within the area of community power is the relative influence and decision-making ability of the local governmental and political institutions as opposed to the economic, industrial, and financial sphere. This characteristic was included in the model primarily because of its relevance to this issue. It offers an action-based indicator within a reputational framework of the defined responsibility of these two spheres. Furthermore, this characteristic

is directly relevant to the analysis of the possibility of successful implementation of the proposed ameliorative action. In empirically applying this model, the researcher is able to determine the relative power of these spheres in the local community. Such characteristics of the leadership pool as institutional dominance, legitimacy, visibility, and scope offer direct indicators of this power differential. In attempting to predict the outcome of proposed ameliorative action, these dimensions, in association with the relative degree of public versus private responsibility, provide extremely useful guidelines. For example, in one community the leadership pool may be dominated by the business and industrial institutions, with little representation by the governmental officials. The leadership pool in this community may also be non-legitimate, invisible, and characterized by a broad scope of influence. The "public" sector in such a community would be subordinate in power to the "private" sphere. Ameliorative action defined by the power actors as being the sole responsibility of the "government" in such a community, would not be as likely to succeed as that which is perceived as a "private" concern. This characteristic, therefore, is a crucial dimension for action analysis.

The nature of the problematic conditions in the community, however, is not the crucial determinant of the degree of "public" versus "private" responsibility. The solution to the same problem (e.g., water pollution) may be defined as a "public" matter in one community, and as a "private" concern in another. What would appear to be a crucial antecedent determinant of this characteristic, however, is the manner in which the leadership pool perceived and defined the local community problems. Unfortunately, there has been no prior study of the association between these dimensions. As a dependent

variable, this characteristic offers the most difficult problems for analyzing its relationship to the determinant dimensions. The nature and direction of the associations between this characteristic and such community problem dimensions as consensus, local solution, uniqueness, and clarity, cannot be predicted prior to empirical examination. These associations, however, due to the deductive nature of the model, can be empirically examined. The direction of other associations, however, can be tentatively proposed on the basis of extrapolations from general sociological findings in the community power literature. For example, as we have noted, many studies have emphasized the dominance of power and decision-making ability held by the economic institution within the local community. It is this sector that often has been defined as possessing the greatest ability to "get things done -- especially those things that it defines as important and desirous." Therefore, we might propose that the greater the perceived seriousness of the local problems, the smaller the degree of defined "public" responsibility for action. Other community problem dimensions, such as the number of problems and the degree of institutional specificity inherent in the definitions, may also be negatively associated with this dimension. The following propositions, however, are tentative.

Illustrative Propositions:

The greater the number of perceived problems, the smaller the degree of defined "public" responsibility for ameliorative action.

The more serious the perceived problems, the smaller the degree of defined "public" responsibility for ameliorative action.

The greater the institutional specificity in the perceived problems, the smaller the degree of defined "public" responsibility for ameliorative action.

E. The Perceived Relevance of Local Community Organizations

Our model contains a third pattern of action that is relevant to the horizontal network of the community. This characteristic refers to the degree to which the power actors define local community organizations as being relevant for the successful implementation of the proposed action. This dimension is interrelated with the preceding two patterns, but it taps different elements of the action. All three of these dimensions are partial indicators of the degree of intra-community, or horizontal involvement. With this third characteristic, however, organizational relevance, as opposed to institutional involvement or "sector" responsibility, is specifically indicated.

For certain action proposals, the perceived relevance of various local community organizations may be low. The involvement of only one or a few organizations may be defined as essential by the power actors for a successful solution. On the other hand, a proposal for ameliorative action may be defined as requiring the active involvement and support of numerous local organizations. Whether the action set is characterized by low or high local organizational relevance would appear to influence such other patterns as the degree of requisite coordination and the possibility of successful implementation. Along these dimensions, this characteristic is very similar to the preceding two variables.

This characteristic, however, has utilitarian value along another dimension. It offers an index of the leadership pool's perception of the viability and influence of various local organizations. If the leadership pool of a community perceived that the local organizations are strong, viable entities which can provide support or opposition to any proposed action, the perceived

level of organizational relevance will probably be high. This pattern especially may be pronounced where local organizations have been active participants in prior issues and programs. In effect they have proven their ability to "muster the forces" to aid or hinder action proposals. Therefore, because of its utility as an indicator of perceived local organizational viability, and its relevance for predicting the outcome of action proposals, we have included this characteristic in our model.

The perception and definition of local problems by the leadership pool would appear to be a determinant of the perceived relevance of local community organizations. Most of our community problem dimensions, with the exception of institutional specificity, would appear to be positively associated with this characteristic. Local community organizations possess human and material resources that may be relevant to the successful implementation of any ameliorative proposal. Where problems are perceived as serious, and especially where they are defined as solvable by the local community, a large number of local organizations is likely to be perceived as relevant to their solution. Furthermore, where the leadership pool illustrates a high degree of consensus and a clear understanding of the specific causal factors involved in the problems, the number of perceived, relevant organizations may be high. Problems perceived and defined in this manner are "ready to be attacked." The utility of the organizations' resources for ameliorating the specific problematical conditions may result in their being more salient to the leadership pool. Where there is little agreement or understanding about the nature of the problems, however, fewer organizations may be viewed as relevant. Finally, if institutionally specific problems are perceived, the degree to which general community organizations will be viewed as relevant will probably be low.

Illustrative Propositions:

The more serious the perceived problems, the greater the perceived relevance of local community organizations.

The higher the level of consensus concerning the perceived problems, the greater the perceived relevance of local community organizations.

The greater the institutional specificity in the perceived problems, the lesser the perceived relevance of local community organizations.

The higher the proportion of locally solvable problems, the greater the perceived relevance of local community organizations.

The more unique the perceived problems, the greater the perceived relevance of local community organizations.

The more clearly defined the perceived problems, the greater the perceived relevance of local community organizations.

F. The Proposed Degree of External, Non-Local Involvement in the Ameliorative Action

In our preceding discussion of community action we noted that such action had its ultimate locus of change within the local community. Furthermore, the participation and involvement of local community units was defined as requisite for such action. Community action, however, may differ in the extent to which the leadership pool defines external, non-local assistance as necessary for its successful implementation. Certain proposals may be defined as requiring no external involvement. The power actors in such situations apparently perceive that the local community possesses the necessary resources, skills, knowledge, and authority to successfully undertake the proposed action. At the other extreme are those problematic conditions that are perceived to be existent within the community, but whose solutions are defined as being

outside the local community's boundaries or control. Inflation may be such a problem. The ameliorative action proposed to solve such problems may be defined by the leadership pool as being totally the responsibility of external units. Of course, a great deal of community action will fall somewhere between these two extremes. The proposal may be defined as the responsibility of the local community with the assistance of outside units, or vice versa.

This dimension has been included in the model because of its importance as an indicator of local autonomy and its utility for the analysis of community action proposals. Unlike the preceding three characteristics which were related to the horizontal network, this dimension is relevant to the vertical axis of the community. It can be utilized to measure the strength of this vertical axis within the community. As such, it indicates the relative degree of local autonomy. For example, the action set, as defined by the leadership pool, may exhibit a high degree of external, non-local involvement in the solution of local community problems. One may propose that the present structure of such a community is dependent upon non-local agencies, i.e., it is non-autonomous. Furthermore, one may infer that the future structure of the community will be at least as dependent as it is currently, and possibly more so due to the projected non-local involvement in the proposed ameliorative action. The characteristic also is valuable in predicting the outcome of the action proposals. For example, suppose that the leadership pool perceived a high level of severity in the problem set, however, they do not define non-local involvement as being required to solve them. A potential bountiful supply of resources, knowledge, and skill thus is defined by the local power actors as being "not needed" to solve their problems. In so doing, one may predict that they lessen their chance for successful amelioration. This

characteristic, therefore, taps two vital elements of any community action. It offers an indication of the likelihood of success, and presents a picture of ideal viability, i.e., it offers at least a partial answer to the question, "Can the community solve the problem itself?"

Whether or not non-local assistance is defined as necessary would appear to be influenced by the power actor's perception and definition of local problems. The most crucial antecedent determinant of this dependent characteristic would obviously be the defined local solvability of the problems. In fact, at first glance such an association may appear to be tautological. It is not. Problems may be defined as solvable by the local community. Such a definition, however, does not prevent the ameliorative action proposal from including a great amount of external, non-local assistance. One would expect to find, however, a strong, negative association between these variables. The perceived level of severity within the problem set, as noted above, would appear to be positively associated with this characteristic. Also the number of perceived problems and their degree of institutional specificity would appear to be positively associated with the level of non-local involvement in the action proposals. As the number of perceived problems increases, it would appear likely that the degree to which the local community is defined as being able to solve them by itself will decrease. Where problems are defined in an institutionally specific manner, the relevance of the horizontal network within the community may not be salient to the leadership pool. In such a situation, they may turn to the vertical axis, particularly to those ties with non-local units existent within their institutional spheres. Other associations also may be deductively drawn from the model, e.g., a negative association between the degree of perceived uniqueness in the problems and

the level of non-local involvement in their solutions. These propositions are, however, heuristic. They are proposed to stimulate comparative empirical study within this area. The strength they contain comes from their place in the deductive model; they share in the validation of every other proposition.

Illustrative Propositions:

The greater the number of perceived problems, the higher the level of non-local involvement in the ameliorative action.

The more serious the perceived problems, the higher the level of non-local involvement in the ameliorative action.

The greater the institutional specificity in the perceived problems, the higher the level of non-local involvement in the ameliorative action.

The higher the proportion of locally solvable problems, the lower the level of non-local involvement in the ameliorative action.

The more unique the perceived problems, the lower the level of non-local involvement in the ameliorative action.

G. The Perceived Possibility of "Blockage"

These last two patterns are included in the model because of their relevance for understanding and predicting the possibility of successfully implementing the action program. This sixth pattern also is important for its relationship to the distribution of power within the community. Basically at issue is the presence of "veto power" within the community. By "blockage" we are referring to the act of opposing, stalling, and successfully defeating any proposal for ameliorative action.

Communities differ in the extent to which their action sets are "blockage-prone." In one community, the power actors may perceive the possibility of one actor, a coalition of actors, or a more formalized group opposing and

defeating any action. A system in such a state has an inordinate amount of power-relevant resources in the possession of a few actors. Also, the probability that they may utilize the resources to "block" any proposal may be predicted by the leadership pool based upon the pool's definition of local problems in combination with its knowledge of the vested interests of the opposition. In another community, the amelioration of only certain perceived problems may be defined as facing possible "blockage." In such instances, no power actor is powerful enough to defeat any and all proposals. Furthermore, in such communities the power actors may be uninterested in blocking action proposals that do not directly affect their interests.

For the researcher interested in predicting the outcome of community action, this characteristic has obvious merit. Any action proposal that is defined by the leadership pool as possibly being opposed and defeated by certain power actors in the community has a smaller probability of success than one which does not face such perceived obstacles.

While the structure of power in the community is obviously a determinant of the perceived possibility of "blockage," so too are the power actors' perception and definition of local problems. For example, such community problem dimensions as the degree of perceived severity inherent in the problems and the level of the power actors' consensus concerning the nature of the problems would appear to be negatively associated with this dependent pattern. If the problem set is perceived by the leadership pool as being very serious, one can assume that the premium on ameliorative action will be high. In such a situation it may be more difficult for an actor to defeat or "veto" the ameliorative proposal. Furthermore, to do so may entail the loss of potentially valuable resource bases for the future exercise of power. Likewise, if the

leadership pool basically is in agreement about the nature and severity of the problem set, the probability that one of them would "buck the tide" and attempt to defeat the proposed action is low. In such cases the existence of consensus on the part of the power actors is itself potentially an extremely powerful resource. Consensus fosters the formation of coalitions and aids the exchange of relevant resources. To attempt to oppose a proposal offered by a consensually based leadership pool may be a folly. On the other hand, such dimensions as the number of problems and the degree of institutional specificity would appear to be positively associated with the perceived probability of "blockage." The larger the number of problems, the greater the probability that some action proposal may be defined as salient to some power actor's vested interests. Furthermore, if the problems are defined in an institutionally specific manner, the likelihood of blockage within a specific institutional area increases.

The above associations and the following propositions are illustrative.

Illustrative Propositions:

The larger the number of perceived problems, the greater the perceived possibility of "blockage."

The more serious the perceived problems, the lesser the perceived possibility of "blockage."

The higher the level of consensus concerning the perceived problems, the lesser the perceived possibility of "blockage."

The greater the institutional specificity in the perceived problems, the greater the perceived possibility of "blockage."

The more unique the perceived problems, the lesser the perceived possibility of "blockage."

The higher the proportion of clearly defined problems, the lesser the perceived possibility of "blockage."

H. The Level of Inactivity

The last characteristic in our set of action patterns, and also the last variable in our model, is the level of inactivity within the set of proposed community actions. This characteristic refers to the proportion of perceived problems for which no action either has been initiated or proposed. It is a dimension of the set of community actions, not of any single action proposal.

This dimension has been included in our model because of its obvious relevance to the probability of successful implementation of community action. It may be considered an indicator of the likelihood of success. Those perceived problems for which (1) no ameliorative action has been undertaken, and (2) the leadership pool offers no ameliorative proposals, are unlikely to be solved in the immediate future. Furthermore, this variable serves as an indicator of the "problem-solving ability" of the leadership pool. If the action set of a community exhibits a high level of inactivity, the community's leadership pool may possibly lack "problem-solving ability."

While other variables may be determinants of the level of inactivity, the leadership pool's perception and definition of problems also would appear to be contributory factors. Throughout the discussion we have noted the association between numerous characteristics and the likelihood of successful implementation of the ameliorative action. We will not review these points at this time, however, they do serve as the basis for the following propositions. Certain community problem dimensions, however, would appear to be crucial determinants of the level of inactivity. Such dimensions as the perceived degree of severity, the level of consensus, and the clarity of the

problem definitions might be negatively associated with this variable. These dimensions all are indicators of the necessity, urgency, and feasibility of instituting ameliorative action. When the values of these dimensions are high, there is a resultant increased demand for action. Local solvability and uniqueness would also appear to be negatively associated with this dimension. We previously noted that if the community is defined as being functionally autonomous and able to solve the problems by itself at the local level, the degree of inactivity would decrease. This negative association may result from the lack of complication involved in not having to secure external aid. Furthermore, if problems are defined as being unique, they are likely to be seen as locally solvable. On the other hand, institutional specificity and the number of problems would appear to be positively associated with the level of inactivity.

Illustrative Propositions:

The larger the number of perceived problems, the higher the level of inactivity.

The more serious the perceived problems, the lower the level of inactivity.

The higher the level of consensus concerning the perceived problems, the lower the level of inactivity.

The greater the institutional specificity in the perceived problems, the higher the level of inactivity.

The greater the proportion of locally solvable problems, the lower the level of inactivity.

The more unique the perceived problems, the lower the level of inactivity.

The higher the proportion of clearly defined problems, the lower the level of inactivity.

In this section we have presented the final component of our model. We have defined our unit of analysis, i.e., community action, and presented seven patterns or characteristics of that unit. Each of the characteristics in the action set was defined, justified, and operationalized. Community action can be classified along these dimensions. A proposal, for example, may be urgent, require little institutional coordination, be viewed as the responsibility of the local government, not require the involvement of many local organizations, require a great deal of external, non-local assistance, and have a high probability of being "blocked." Action sets similarly may be classified.

In addition, possible associations between these characteristics and the independent community problem dimensions were proposed. These propositions are presented in matrix form in Figure 4. These associations are offered for empirical examination. They are tentative and may be viewed as heuristic. The development of these propositions could have been greatly facilitated by the existence of previous literature in the field. There is none. In fact, the farther we have moved from our first set of propositions (i.e., the relationship between community structural variables and the characteristics of the leadership pool) the more tenuous have been the proposed associations. These propositions have been developed on the basis of careful analysis utilizing the logical deductive framework of the model.

Finally, although we have not posited these patterns of community action as independent variables, they obviously are associated with the crucial dependent variable of the likelihood of successful implementation. Given that action within the community system may alter the structure and processes of the system, these patterns may be viewed as related to the future structure of the community. We have completed the circle.

Figure 4

THE RELATIONSHIP OF THE COMMUNITY PROBLEM DIMENSIONS
TO THE PATTERNS OF COMMUNITY ACTION

Community Problem Dimensions	Patterns of Community Action						
	Urgency	Institut'l Coordinat'n	Public Respon'y	Organizat'l Relevance	External Involvement	Blockage	Inactivity
Number	-	*	-	+	+	+	+
Seriousness	+	+	-	+	+	-	-
Consensus	*	+	*	+	+	-	-
Institutional Specificity	+	-	-	-	+	+	+
Local Solvability	*	+	*	+	-	+	-
Uniqueness	+	+	*	+	-	+	-
Clarity of Def.	+	+	*	+	*	-	-

+ = Positive Association; - = Negative Association; * = Direction of Relationship Not Known Prior to Empirical Examination

Summary

To reiterate, the model includes four sets of variables: (1) community structural variables, (2) characteristics of the leadership pool, (3) community problem dimensions, and (4) patterns of community action. The general theoretical assumption of this model is that community structural variables influence the characteristics of the community leadership pool. Furthermore, the characteristics of the leadership pool affect the manner in which the local power actors perceive and define community problems. Finally, the nature of these community problem definitions will influence the structure of action proposed by the leadership pool to ameliorate these problems. In the previous two chapters a total of thirty-three variables has been presented under these general sets. Each of these variables has been defined, explicated, justified, operationalized, and placed in the model as an independent and/or dependent variable. These variables are not logically exhaustive. They have been selected for their apparent utility as meaningful dimensions for examining the interrelationships posed in this model. They are variables which are important for the analysis of the distribution of power, the nature of problem definitions, and the structure of community action. Furthermore, it is assumed that these variables covary. The extent of these interrelationships, however, must be determined by future empirical examination. Conceptually, the model requires refinement. This is a first step in its development. For example, some of the proposed associations, particularly those in the first set of propositions, have at least some empirical support. We have noted this support when it has been available. For many of the associations, however, no support is available. These have been deductively drawn based upon the general

theoretical assumptions of the model. They also await empirical examination. Finally, as a practical tool the model is crucial for determining the "problem-solving ability and methods" of the community leadership pool. Such knowledge may be of paramount importance to anyone who wishes to institute ameliorative action or social change within the local community.

Part 2

Selected Empirical Applications

The model presented in the previous section is comprehensive enough to provide a guide for a variety of empirical applications. Three different aspects are presented here. First, the variables used in the model are described for six different communities -- four of them in the below 20,000 and two above. Second, in two of these communities, certain types of community action relating to water problems have been taken and certain preliminary comments will be made about some of the factors involved in these decisions. Third, certain findings relating to the perception of water problems in the smaller communities will be compared with similar findings in the two larger communities.

Testing the model previously presented requires the selection of communities as units of analysis. To fully test the model would require a large number of sample units observed over a long time period. While this is an ultimate goal, certain compromises have to be made to reduce the possibilities of investigation to manageable size. As indicated above, six communities are used here for analysis. These six communities have certain similarities in common and also possess certain differences. They will be used to illustrate both similarities and differences.

Selection of Communities

The first task was to select communities which were similar in certain respects but also different in terms of certain objective conditions. One set of communities involved four cities from 10,000 to 17,000 population (see Figure 5). These were relatively autonomous communities, not closely linked to a neighboring metropolitan area. They were also county seats.

They differed, however, on the presence or absence of particular types of community problems. One of these communities has historically had a number of flooding problems; another, problems with flooding as well as pollution;

Figure 5

POPULATION SIZE AND RATE OF GROWTH IN THE SIX COMMUNITIES

City	Population Size (1960)	Rate of Growth	Problem
Lowell	10,585	19.5	Pollution
Teayston	11,059	26.8	Flooding/Pollution
Jefferson	12,388	17.3	None
Demain	16,847	5.4	Flooding
Custer	22,968	7.0	Pollution
Ashville	24,559	3.6	Pollution

the third community has current problems of pollution and the fourth with no current indications of flooding or pollution. The other set of communities involved two cities, matched approximately in size (averaging 23,750). Both of these cities are located on one of the Great Lakes and both are confronted with serious water pollution problems in their immediate environment. Both are relatively autonomous in that they are not part of a large neighboring metropolitan area. While only one is a county seat, the other is clearly the dominant city in the county in which it is located.

Techniques Used to Identify the Community Leadership Pool

Since there are several ways in which community leaders can be identified, the approach used here involved several steps. First, community knowledgeables were asked to identify individuals in each of the communities who were influential in "general community affairs." In the four smaller communities, these community knowledgeables were the county extension agent, the president of the chamber of commerce, and the newspaper editor. In the larger communities, the city attorney and the head of the largest union were included in addition. From these original nominations, names of those who had been mentioned at least twice were included on the initial list. In an attempt not to overlook other power actors, the study was designed so that these reputed power actors were also asked to name anyone else in the community that was influential. If the mayor or the local newspaper editor were not included in the list, they were automatically included in the leadership pool since our initial findings indicated that these positions were important in the local system, regardless of the abilities of the incumbents.

Using this as the sample base, a Leadership Pool Interview Schedule was developed to obtain information relevant to the structure, distribution, and exercise of power in the community, the perception and definition of general community problems, as well as specific water-related problems. A field team interviewed these leaders in the six communities; the interviews ranged from 45 minutes to almost four hours and averaged about an hour and a half. The data in the following sections are based on these interviews.

The model presented previously was constructed on the assumption that the structure of the community was a determinant of the nature, distribution, and structure of power within the community. A general working hypothesis

is that the structure and distribution of power among the leadership pool will influence the nature of the community leadership's perceptions and definition of local problems and, subsequently, the nature of this leadership's proposals for ameliorative action. Illustrations of the measure of some of the variables are shown below.

Empirical Description of Variables

(Figures 6 through 33 are found in Appendix)

Community Structural Variables

A. Population size and rate of growth (see figure 5)

B. Demographic heterogeneity (see figure 6)

C. Degree of economic autonomy (see figure 7)

D. Degree of governmental-political autonomy (see figure 8)

E. Level of organizational density (see figure 9)

F. Economic base (see figures 10 and 11)

G. Social class (see figure 12)

Characteristics of the Leadership Pool

A. Size of the leadership pool (see figure 13)

B. Institutional dominance (see figures 14 and 15)

C. Social class composition of the leadership pool (see figure 16)

D. Legitimacy (see figure 17)

E. Cohesiveness (see figure 18)

F. Entrenchment (see figure 19)

G. Cosmopolitanism-Localism (see figures 20 and 21)

Community Problem Dimensions

A. Number of different perceived problems (see figures 22 and 23)

B. Perceived seriousness of the problems (see figure 24)

C. Degree of consensus concerning the severity of the community problems (see figure 3)

D. Defined possibility of local solution (see figure 25)

E. Degree of uniqueness in problem definitions (see figure 26)

F. Degree of clarity inherent in the problem definition (see figure 27)

Patterns of Community Action

A. Urgency or immediacy of instituting the ameliorative action (see figure 28)

B. Degree of institutional coordination required to successfully implement the proposed ameliorative action (see figure 29)

C. Degree of public responsibility for action (see figure 30)

D. Degree of perceived relevance of local organizations (see figure 31)

E. Perceived possibility of "blockage" (see figure 32)

F. Level of inactivity (see figure 33)

The complexity of testing the total model is great. In a preliminary study on the four smaller communities, Wenger found that, of 143 propositions between the sets of the four major dimensions, the directionality of 64.3 percent was supported.[12] Two other aspects are explored further here. Next, differences between two of the communities studied in their decision making will be explored. Later, water resource problems will be considered in the context of other community problems.

Decision Making and its Implementation

The advantage of collecting data on communities is that it can provide a base line for observing certain subsequent decisions and the direction of

these decisions. Base line data were collected on the four smaller communities. Two years later, follow-up trips were taken to each of these communities and the two members of the leadership pool who were most concerned with water-related problems were re-interviewed. These interviews were relatively open-ended in which the variety of community actions which had been initiated, and/or completed during that two-year period were explored. In brief summary, the activities within the four communities are as follows:

Lowell. New 16-inch water lines had been installed in order to handle the communities' growing industrial needs. There was some indication that there would be a future crisis in both the quantity and quality of water available.

In addition, a completely new sewage treatment plant had been built to serve the area. All funding for this project came through appropriations by city council. No bonds were sold, nor was there state or federal aid.

Teayston. A 12-inch line had been completed to serve a new industrial user and industrial water rates had been raised. Plans for a new waste-water treatment facility had been drawn and approved by council but no funds had been allocated nor were alternative funding plans being considered. Several observers suggested that the treatment facility will not be implemented until there is a crisis.

Jefferson. No actions had been taken on any aspect of water-related problems within the past two years. It will be recalled that this was the control community in the first four and was characterized by a lack of problems.

Demain. Certain technical changes had been made in the water system. Old valves had continued to be replaced. Some new lines had been constructed

to new industrial sites. Some new wells had been added to the system. A rate increase was anticipated in 1972.

Ground had been broken for a new water treatment plant. The new facility costing almost $3 million, of which over half will come from federal funding. The rate increase is designed to raise the city portion.

An interesting contrast is presented by the differences between Lowell and Demain. In particular, it is interesting to attempt to focus on the decision in Lowell to make major improvements in sewage treatment without any outside-state and federal funding. By contrast, Demain made certain improvements using a major portion of the funding from outside the community. In the previous figures, data on comparisons on a number of dimensions between Lowell and Demain can be observed.

Lowell and Demain tend to have somewhat similar institutional representation in their leadership pool (see Figure 15, Appendix), both having business and industry as the dominant institution. Lowell shows a higher social class composition in its leadership pool. In addition, other data collected seems to indicate that Lowell had the most cohesive leadership pool of the four smaller cities. The cohesiveness was expressed in the sense of joining other power actors for lunch, having them as close friends, and exchanging visits. By contrast, the leadership pool in Demain showed the least cohesion (see Figure 18, Appendix).

Of most interest is the earlier contrast between Lowell and Demain on the question of whether local community problems could be solved without outside assistance. Of our four smaller communities, the leadership pool perceives that 83.4 percent of the most important current problems could be solved by the local community. Thus, the community is defined as a viable,

problem-solving entity by the leadership pool. At the other extreme, only 33.3 percent of the problems perceived to exist in Demain are defined as being solvable at the local level (see Figure 25, Appendix). In addition, the power actors were asked if their proposed solutions to major problems in the community were public or "private" concerns. Almost half of the action proposals offered by the leadership pool in Demain were defined as purely public, governmental concerns. By contrast, less than 17 percent of the problems in Lowell were defined as public concerns.

In addition, in discussing their proposals for solving the major community problems, the power actors were asked if outside, non-local assistance would be needed. The greatest degree of non-local involvement was defined as being necessary in Demain. Of the total of 21 separate action proposals, 11 or 52.3 percent were defined as being either the combined concerns of both local and non-local units or the primary responsibility of non-local agents. At the other extreme, all of the proposals in Lowell were defined as being primarily local concerns.

The differences between Lowell and Demain should suggest that the model outlined previously has a degree of predictability. The leadership pool in Lowell showed the greatest degree of assurance that local community problems could be solved without outside assistance. This collective definition of primary responsibility within the local community was reflected in Lowell's assumption of complete responsibility for development and financing of a new sewage treatment plant.

The Perception of Water Resource Problems in the Six Communities

In a previous paper,[13] certain aspects of the community perception of water resource problems were reported in the four smaller cities. Here, with the addition of the two larger cities, we will discuss any changes that need to be made in that previous interpretation.

One of the major research questions was to determine if the power actors in the communities were aware of existing water-related problems. If a problem is not salient to those in the leadership pool, it is unlikely that they will utilize their social power and power-relevant resources to solve it. To determine the salience of water-related problems, the power actors were asked: (1) what they considered to be the two major problems in the community in the past five years and (2) what they considered to be the major current problem. As Figure 34 (Appendix) indicates, water problems were not particularly salient to the power actors within these communities. A total of 291 problems were cited. Of these only 12 or 2.4 percent were water related. In the larger cities, however, there was a higher degree of salience than in the four smaller cities.

A more sensitive indicator of salience is the percent of the leadership pool which cited these problems at least once. Figure 35 (Appendix) presents the percent of each leadership pool which cited water-related problems. In both of the larger cities, a significantly larger percent of the power actors do cite water problems than in the smaller cities. In part, this difference may be somewhat exaggerated by the smaller number of power actors.

Another aspect of problem definition was obtained when the various power actors were presented a list of problems and asked to judge whether the

specific problems were (1) very serious, (2) fairly serious, or (3) not serious in the community. The list included the following problems: (1) industrial and economic development; (2) housing, building and urban renewal; (3) race and ethnic relations; (4) educational concerns; (5) health; (6) culture; (7) public improvements and services; (8) social welfare, crime, and delinquency; (9) water problems; and (10) recruitment of public servants. In this particular format, the leaders tended to rank water problems more serious than the overall rank of the others.

One factor important for problem solving is the consensus within the leadership pool as to the degree of seriousness of particular problems. Conflict and disagreement over the degree of severity of local problems is likely to impede problem solving. To measure this dimension, an Index of Consensus was developed.[14] This index is a measure of dispersion and has a value from .000 to 1,000. If each problem was rated identically by each power actor, there would be complete agreement or consensus regarding the severity of the problem and the index would be 1.000. A value of .430 represents 43 percent of the maximum possible consensus. The results of this analysis are presented in Figure 36 (Appendix). In general, they indicate that there is less consensus evidenced by the leadership pools concerning the water problems than there is concerning other community problems. In one of the larger cities, Custer, the consensus on water is almost the same as for the general problems. In the rest of the cities, there is less consensus on water problems than for general community problems.

Another factor which was studied was the degree to which the power actors defined the local community as being able to solve a problem by itself at the local level. The leadership pool in each of the communities was asked a

series of questions concerning the solution of problems which they had defined as being most important. Figure 37 (Appendix) indicates that the power actors in the six communities do not perceive the local community as being able to solve the water-related problems by itself. The degree of local solvability seen in water problems is much lower than the degree seen for other major community problems. In only one community, Custer, is there any confidence in the ability of the community to solve its problems. Several years ago a construction of an extensive water purification system was undertaken; the facility (an example of substantial federal funding) was nearing completion at the time of our research. The community anticipated the beginning of the plant's operations. The end result is that while Custer sees a water-related problem as existent, the problem is looked upon as, essentially, solved. The two larger communities, then, show the least and the most confidence in their ability to solve water-related problems.

Certain community problems require the coordination of many different institutional areas to implement action proposals. If successful implementation is contingent upon the involvement and coordination of many different institutional areas, the community is faced with a complex activity. If, however, a solution can be undertaken by one or two institutions, the problems inherent in the coordination of many units can be minimized. Each power actor was asked which institutions should be involved in action and seeking solutions to specific community problems. Those proposals which involved three or more institutional areas were classified as requiring coordination. The results presented in Figure 38 (Appendix) suggest that power actors perceive that the solution to water problems within these communities does not require

extensive institutional coordination. The two larger cities are at the extremes -- Custer the least and Ashville the most.

In discussing possible solutions to community problems, the power actors within the six communities were asked if their proposed solutions to problems were (1) private, (2) public, or (3) a mixed private and public responsibility. The percent of water and general problems which were defined as solely "public" concerns is presented in Figure 39 (Appendix). It indicates that solutions to water-related problems are seen as being almost the exclusive concern of the public sector. These findings are reinforced by the addition of the two larger cities.

One final dimension will be included here. The power actors were given a list of 20 local organizations and offices and asked to rank each organization's relevance to action proposals. In general, the rank order for both general and for water problems was similar, but local governmental representatives were seen as being more essential to water problems than to other issues. In the larger cities, the newspapers, the chamber of commerce, and local radio and TV seemingly were considered more important to water problems than they were in smaller communities. In addition there are indications that in the larger communities, the labor unions were much more important both for general community problems and for water-related problems.

Summary

In general, the addition of two larger communities does not basically affect the previous findings. Among community leaders in six different communities, water-related problems were characterized by low salience and by low consensus. In seeking solutions, these leaders see water-related problems

as being less likely to be solved at the local community level, although one of f our large communities was an exception to this pattern. They also see water-related problems as requiring a relatively low level of community coordination and as being primarily the responsibility of the public sector. Local governmental leaders were seen as being more important in problem solving than they were in other community problems.

Footnotes

[1] Barth examined six community case studies and on the basis of their findings proposed a similar generalization. He offered that absentee-owned and operated businesses were associated with a diffuse distribution of influence. Ernest A. T. Barth, "Community Influence Systems: Structure and Change," Social Forces, 40 (October 1961), pp. 58-63.

[2] Terry Clark (ed.) Community Structure and Decision Making: Comparative Analysis (San Francisco: Chandler Publishing Co., 1968), p. 103.

[3] Roland Warren, "Toward a Non-Utopian Normative Model of the Community," a paper delivered at the annual meetings of the American Sociological Association, September 3, 1969, 22 pages, mimeo.

[4] John Walton, "The Vertical Axis of Community Organization and the Structure of Power," Southwestern Social Science Quarterly, 48 (December 1967), pp. 353-368.

[5] Ibid., p. 363.

[6] For example, see Paul Hatt and Albert Reiss, "Functional Specialization of Cities," in Hatt and Reiss, eds., Cities and Society (Glencoe, Illinois: Free Press, 1957), pp. 555-557; Chauncy Harris, "A Functional Classification of Cities in the United States," in Mayer and Kohn, eds., Readings in Urban Geography (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1959), pp. 129-138; Howard J. Nelsen, "A Service Classification of American Cities," in Harold Melvin Mayer and Clyde Kohn, eds., Readings in Urban Geography (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1959), pp. 139-160; and Albert Reiss, "Community Specialization in Durable and Nondurable Goods Manufactures," Land Economics, 34 (May 1958), pp. 122-134.

[7] Delbert C. Miller, "Power, Complimentarity, and the Cutting Edge of Research," Sociological Focus, 1 (Summer 1968), pp. 1-18.

[8] Joe Bohlen, George Beal, Gerald Klonglon, and John Tait, Community Power Structure and Civil Defense, Rural Sociology Report No. 35 (Ames, Iowa: Iowa State University of Science and Technology, Department of Economics and Sociology, 1964). Cited in Bohlen, et al., A Comparative Analysis of Community Power Structures (Department of Sociology and Anthropology Iowa State University, 1967), p. 96.

[9] Charles Bonjean and David Olson, "Community Leadership: Directions of Research," Administrative Science Quarterly, 9 (December 1964), pp. 278-300.

[10] Robert K. Merton, Social Theory and Social Structure (Glencoe: Free Press, 1957), pp. 387-420.

[11] Robert K. Merton, "Patterns of Influence: A Study of Interpersonal Influence and of Communications Behavior in a Local Community," in Lazarsfeld and Stanton, eds., Communication Research in 1948-49 (New York: Harper, 1949), pp. 180-219.

[12] Dennis E. Wenger, "Toward A Comparative Model For the Analysis of Community Power: A Conceptualization and Empirical Application: (Ph.D dissertation, The Ohio State University, 1970), pp. 360-361.

[13] Russell R. Dynes and Dennis Wenger, "Factors in the Community Perception of Water Resource Problems," Water Resources Bulletin, Vol. 7, No. 4, (August 1971), pp. 644-651.

[14] The formula representing this index is $I_c = I - \frac{D_I}{N_p D_{max}}$ where I_c = Index of Consensus; D_I + = the dispersion or dissensus with each problem and is computed by $D_I = N_p - M_o$ where M_o is the number of the model category and N_p is the total number of problems; D_{max} is the maximum possible dissensus and is computed by $D_{max} = N - N/3$ where N is the number of power actors.

Appendix

Figure 6

DEMOGRAPHIC HETEROGENEITY IN THE SIX COMMUNITIES

City	Percent Non-white	Percent Foreign-Born	Total	Heterogeneity Rank
Lowell	.3	1.2	1.5	6
Teayston	2.9	.6	3.5	4
Jefferson	3.9	.5	4.4	3
Demain	1.3	.9	2.2	5
Custer	4.0	4.1	8.1	2
Ashville	5.0	5.9	10.9	1

Figure 7

THE DEGREE OF ECONOMIC AUTONOMY IN THE SIX COMMUNITIES

City	Percent of Local Industry that is Absentee-Owned	Percent of Labor Force Working Outside City
Lowell	42.8	15.1
Teayston	44.4	17.2
Jefferson	37.8	14.0
Demain	55.0	6.7
Custer	*	12.2
Ashville	*	3.7

* Data not available

Figure 8

THE DEGREE OF GOVERNMENTAL-POLITICAL AUTONOMY IN THE SIX COMMUNITIES

City	Per Capita Government Expenditure	Number of Government Functions	Percent of Budget from State-Federal	Residents Full-time Gov. Empl.
Lowell	96.17	15	22.7	130.7
Teayston	103.82	17	11.6	73.2
Jefferson	48.19	13	26.2	302.1
Demain	63.27	13	21.9	160.5
Custer	81.6	12	21.3	*
Ashville	85.3	14	18.5	335.0

* Data not available

Figure 9

THE LEVEL OF ORGANIZATIONAL DENSITY
IN THE SIX COMMUNITIES

City	Number of Local Organizations	Residents Per Organization	Organizational Density Rank
Lowell	125	84.6	2
Teayston	158	69.9	1
Jefferson	116	106.7	3
Demain	91	185.1	4
Custer	*	*	*
Ashville	*	*	*

* Data not available

Figure 10

TOP FIVE EMPLOYMENT CATEGORIES IN THE SIX COMMUNITIES

Lowell		Teayston		Jefferson		Demain		Custer		Ashville	
Category	Percent	Category	Percent	Category	Percent	Category	Percent	Category	Percent	Category	Percent
Manuf'g	37.7	Manuf'g	32.1	Manuf'g	28.6	Manuf'g	24.8	Manuf'g	42.2	Manuf'g	28.1
Ret'l Td	13.2	Const'n	11.4	Ret'l Td	12.9	Ret'l Td	13.9	Ret'l Td	9.0	Ret'l Td	10.9
Educat'n	5.0	Ret'l td	9.2	Const'n	6.9	Educat'n	11.5	Const'n	4.0	RR Railway Express	10.7
Constr'n	3.9	Pub Adm	4.7	Eat&Dr	5.6	Const'n	5.8	Pub Adm	4.0	Educat'n	4.0
Whol Td	3.5	Educat'n	4.6	Whol Td	4.3	Eat&Dr	4.1	Educat'n	3.0	Util&Sanit'y	3.8
Total	63.3	Total	62.0	Total	58.3	Total	60.1	Total	62.2	Total	57.6

Figure 11

THE DEGREE OF ECONOMIC DIVERSITY IN THE SIX COMMUNITIES

City	Percentage of Labor Force in Major Local Employment Categories			
	In Top Two	In Top Three	In Top Four	Diversity Rank
Lowell	50.9	55.9	59.8	6
Teayston	43.5	52.7	57.4	4
Jefferson	41.5	48.4	54.0	2
Demain	38.7	50.2	56.0	3
Custer	51.2	55.2	59.2	5
Ashville	39.0	49.7	53.7	1

Figure 12

MEDIAN EDUCATION AND INCOME
FOR THE SIX COMMUNITIES

City	Median Education	Median Income
Lowell	11.4	5,592
Teayston	10.8	5,499
Jefferson	10.9	5,067
Demain	11.7	5,151
Custer	9.7	6,081
Ashville	11.0	5,663
State	10.9	6,531

Figure 13

SIZE OF LEADERSHIP POOL IN THE SIX COMMUNITIES

City	Number of Power Actors	Rank
Lowell	18	3
Teayston	17	4
Jefferson	20	2
Demain	21	1
Custer	11	5
Ashville	9	6

Figure 14

INSTITUTIONAL REPRESENTATION IN THE
LEADERSHIP POOL IN THE SIX COMMUNITIES

Institution	Lowell		Teayston		Jefferson		Demain		Custer		Ashville	
	No.	Percent	No.	Percent	No.	Percent	No.	Percent	No.	Percent	No.	Percent
Government	5	27.8	7	41.2	2	10.0	6	28.6	3	27.3	3	33.3
Bus & Ind	8	44.4	6	35.3	11	55.0	9	42.9	4	36.3	2	22.2
Education	1	5.6	1	5.9	3	15.0	2	9.5	1	9.2	1	11.1
Media	1	5.6	2	11.8	1	5.0	2	9.5	1	9.2	1	11.1
Professions	1	5.6	1	5.9	1	5.0	1	4.8	1	9.2	0	0.0
Finance	0	0.0	0	0.0	2	10.0	1	4.8	0	0.0	1	11.1
Religion	2	11.1	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0	1	9.2	1	11.1

Figure 15

THE DEGREE OF INSTITUTIONAL DOMINANCE
IN THE SIX LEADERSHIP POOLS

City	Dominant Institution	Percent in Dominant Institution	Percent Difference*	Rank
Lowell	Bus & Ind	44.4	+5.5	2
Teayston	Gov	41.2	-5.9	6
Jefferson	Bus & Ind	55.0	+30.0	1
Demain	Bus & Ind	42.9	+4.8	3
Custer	Bus & Ind	36.3	-0.2	5
Ashville	Gov	33.3	0.0	4

*Percent Difference is computed by summing the combined percentage totals of the second and third most represented institutions and then subtracting this total from the percent in the dominant institution

Figure 16

SOCIAL CLASS COMPOSITION AND RANK
OF THE SIX LEADERSHIP POOLS

City	Median North-Hatt Score	Median Years of Education	Social Class Rank
Lowell	82	16.9	1
Teayston	80	16.8	2
Jefferson	79	15.1	5
Demain	81	15.7	3
Custer	82	15.6	4
Ashville	79	16.8	2
Sample Average	81	16.1	

Figure 17

DEGREE OF LEGITIMACY IN THE SIX LEADERSHIP POOLS

City	Number of Legitimate Power Actors	Percent of Legitimacy in Pool	Legitimacy Rank
Lowell	6	33.3	4
Teayston	9	52.9	2
Jefferson	6	30.3	5
Demain	9	42.8	3
Custer	2	18.2	6
Ashville	4	57.1	1
Average	6	37.4	

Figure 18

DEGREE OF COHESIVENESS IN THE SIX LEADERSHIP POOLS

City	Average Percent Lunch	Average Percent Friendship	Average Percent Visit	Total Percent	Average Weighted Score	Cohesive Rank
Lowell	24.2	30.1	20.1	74.4	32.2	1
Jefferson	31.0	30.7	7.6	69.3	29.7	2
Demain	16.2	27.5	5.5	49.2	29.9	3
Teayston	20.0	26.4	7.5	53.9	25.5	4
Custer	*	*	*	*	*	*
Ashville	*	*	*	*	*	*

* Data not available

Figure 19

LEVEL OF ENTRENCHMENT IN THE SIX LEADERSHIP POOLS

City	Mean Age	Mean Years in Community	I_E *
Lowell	48.3	25.1	.519
Teayston	45.0	35.1	.700
Jefferson	53.4	28.3	.529
Demain	50.7	33.7	.665
Custer	55.0	36.4	1.51
Ashville	55.0	54.2	1.01

* Index of Entrenchment is $I_E = \frac{Ma}{Myc}$ where I_E = the Index of Entrenchment; Ma = the mean age of the leadership pool; and Myc = the mean number of years spent in the community by the leadership pool.

Figure 20

LEVELS OF LOCAL AND NON-LOCAL INTERESTS IN
THE SIX LEADERSHIP POOLS

City	State	National	Local	County	International
Lowell	2.50	2.5	1	4.0	5.0
Teayston	2.50	4.0	1	2.5	5.0
Jefferson	3.00	4.0	1	2.0	5.0
Demain	2.00	3.5	1	3.5	5.0
Custer	2.56	3.33	1.56	2.78	4.78
Ashville	3.33	2.5	1.16	3.17	4.84
Average Rank	2.65	3.3	1	2.95	4.91

Figure 21

DEGREE OF COSMOPOLITANISM
IN THE SIX LEADERSHIP POOLS

City	Mean	Percent Cosmopolitan
Lowell	3.33	33.3
Teayston	2.68	31.2
Jefferson	2.50	10.6
Demain	2.87	28.6
Custer	2.50	*
Ashville	3.50	*
Average	2.88	

* Data not available

Figure 22

THE NUMBER OF DIFFERENT PERCEIVED PROBLEMS AND THE NUMBER OF DIFFERENT PERCEIVED PROBLEMS PER POWER ACTOR IN THE SIX COMMUNITIES

City	Number of Different Problems	Number of Different Problems Per Power Actor
Lowell	12	.667
Teayston	12	.750
Jefferson	12	.632
Demain	14	.667
Custer	6	.545
Ashville	6	.666
City Average	10.3	.651

Figure 23

THE RANK ORDERING OF THE SIX MOST SALIENT PROBLEMS
IN EACH OF THE SIX COMMUNITIES

Rank	Teayston Problem	Times Cited	Lowell Problem	Times Cited	Demain Problem	Times Cited	Jefferson Problem	Times Cited
1	Pub. Improv't & Services	12	Industry & Econ Devel	13	Urban Renewal	15	Education	14
2	Education	9	Education	12	Pub. Improv't & Services	11	Pub. Improv't & Services	9
3	Finances	7	Pub. Improv't & Services	6	Education	9	Finances	9
4	Recruitm't of Pub Servants	6	Social Welfare	6	Finances	8	Industry & Econ Devel	8
5	Planning	4	Finances	5	Industry & Econ Devel	4	Housing & Building	7
6	Airport	2	Recruitm't of Pub Servants	3	Community Apathy	3	Urban Renewal	3

Figure 23 continued

Rank	Custer Problem	Times Cited	Ashville Problem	Times Cited
1	Education	6	Water	3
2	Water	5	Education	3
3	Air Pollution	4	Housing	2
4	Public Improvements	2	Air Pollution	1
5	Housing	2	Economic Development	1
6	Economic Development	1	Recruitment of Pub Servants	1

Figure 24

THE DEFINED DEGREE OF SEVERITY INHERENT IN
TEN SELECTED PROBLEMS FOR THE SIX COMMUNITIES

City	Degree of Severity		
	Percent Very Serious	Percent Fairly Serious	Percent Not Serious
Lowell	11.1	37.2	51.6
Teayston	24.3	38.1	37.5
Jefferson	12.6	36.8	50.5
Demain	18.1	34.7	47.1
Custer	41.6	41.6	16.7
Ashville	25.0	58.3	16.7
Average	22.3	41.1	36.6

Figure 25

THE DEGREE OF LOCAL SOLUTION INHERENT
IN THE PROBLEM DEFINITIONS OF THE SIX LEADERSHIP POOLS

City	Percent of Problems Perceived to be Locally Solvable	Rank
Lowell	83.4	1
Teayston	43.7	5
Jefferson	63.2	2
Demain	33.3	6
Custer	56.5	4
Ashville	57.4	3
Average	56.2	

Figure 26

THE DEGREE OF UNIQUENESS INHERENT IN THE PROBLEM DEFINITIONS OF THE LEADERSHIP POOLS

City	Percent of Problems Perceived to be Unique	Rank
Lowell	11.1	5
Teayston	12.5	4
Jefferson	15.8	2
Demain	14.3	3
Custer	22.2	1
Ashville	0.0	6
Average	12.6	

Figure 27

THE DEGREE OF CLARITY INHERENT IN
THE PROBLEM DEFINITIONS OF THE SIX LEADERSHIP POOLS

City	Percent of Problems For Which No Cause Was Imputed	Percent of Problems For Which Specific Cause Was Imputed	Rank
Lowell	16.6	60.0	1
Teayston	6.3	26.7	5
Jefferson	5.3	33.3	3
Demain	9.5	31.6	4
Custer	0.0	44.4	2
Ashville	0.0	33.3	3
Average		38.2	

Figure 28

THE PERCEIVED DEGREE OF URGENCY INHERENT
IN THE ACTION SETS IN THE SIX COMMUNITIES

City	Percent Urgent	Percent Semi-Urgent	Percent Not Urgent
Lowell	38.8	27.7	33.3
Teayston	87.6	6.2	6.2
Jefferson	57.8	31.5	10.5
Demain	57.1	28.5	14.2
Custer	0.0	33.3	66.7
Ashville	16.8	33.3	50.0
Average	43.0	26.7	30.1

Figure 29

THE PERCEIVED DEGREE OF INSTITUTIONAL COORDINATION INHERENT IN THE ACTION SETS IN THE SIX COMMUNITIES

City	Percent Requiring Coordination	Percent Not Requiring Coordination
Lowell	44.4	55.5
Teayston	12.5	87.5
Jefferson	31.5	68.4
Demain	33.3	66.6
Custer	33.3	66.6
Ashville	28.6	71.4
Average	32.2	69.2

Figure 30

THE PERCENTAGE OF "PUBLIC" RESPONSIBILITY INHERENT IN THE ACTION SETS IN THE SIX COMMUNITIES

City	Percent of Problems Defined As "Public" Concerns	Rank
Lowell	16.7	6
Teayston	31.2	4
Jefferson	26.3	5
Demain	47.6	2
Custer	55.6	1
Ashville	42.8	3
Average	36.5	

Figure 31

THE DEGREE OF PERCEIVED ORGANIZATIONAL RELEVANCE
INHERENT IN THE ACTION SETS IN THE SIX COMMUNITIES

City	Percent Essential	Percent Important	Percent Not Important
Lowell	41.9	27.5	30.5
Teayston	39.6	26.2	34.0
Jefferson	43.4	27.6	28.9
Demain	52.8	27.0	20.0
Custer	43.3	36.6	19.4
Ashville	45.8	33.3	20.0
Average	44.4	29.7	25.6

Figure 32

THE DEGREE OF PERCEIVED "BLOCKAGE" INHERENT IN THE ACTION SETS IN THE SIX COMMUNITIES

City	Percent Blockage By Individuals	Percent Blockage By Groups	Average Percent By Either
Lowell	33.3	66.6	50.0
Teayston	12.5	50.0	31.3
Jefferson	31.5	73.6	52.5
Demain	47.6	47.6	47.6
Custer	44.5	44.5	44.5
Ashville	33.3	50.0	44.1
Average	33.8	55.4	45.0

Figure 33

THE LEVEL OF INACTIVITY INHERENT
IN THE ACTION SETS IN THE SIX COMMUNITIES

City	Percent of Problems for Which No Ameliorative Activity Has Been Undertaken	Rank
Lowell	5.50	6
Teayston	31.20	2
Jefferson	15.70	3
Demain	9.50	5
Custer	11.11	4
Ashville	33.33	1
Average	12.1	

Figure 34

THE SALIENCE OF WATER-RELATED PROBLEMS
TO THE POWER ACTORS IN THE SIX COMMUNITIES

City	Number of Perceived Problems	Number Citing Water Problems	Percent
Lowell	54	2	3.7
Teayston	48	2	4.2
Jefferson	57	0	0.0
Demain	63	1	1.6
Custer	48	4	8.3
Ashville	21	3	14.2
Total	291	12	

Figure 35

THE PERCENT OF THE POWER ACTORS IN THE SIX COMMUNITIES WHO CITED WATER-RELATED PROBLEMS AS IMPORTANT COMMUNITY CONCERNS

City	Number of Power Actors	Number Citing Water Problems	Percent
Lowell	18	2	11.1
Teayston	16	2	12.5
Jefferson	19	0	0.0
Demain	21	1	4.6
Custer	9	4	44.4
Ashville	7	3	43.8
Average	15	2	19.4

Figure 36

A COMPARISON OF THE DEGREE OF CONSENSUS EVIDENCED BY EACH LEADERSHIP POOL CONCERNING THE SEVERITY OF WATER AND GENERAL PROBLEMS IN THE SIX COMMUNITIES

City	Water Index of Consensus	Water Rank	General Index of Consensus	General Rank
Lowell	.250	5	.367	4
Teayston	.000	6	.270	5
Jefferson	.333	1	.392	3
Demain	.286	2	.450	1
Custer	.257	3	.250	6
Ashville	.250	4	.450	2
Average	.229		.363	

Figure 37

A COMPARISON OF THE DEGREE OF LOCAL SOLVABILITY INHERENT IN THE PROBLEM DEFINITIONS OF WATER AND GENERAL PROBLEMS IN THE SIX COMMUNITIES

City	Percent of Water Problems Defined As Being Locally Solvable	Water Rank	Percent of General Problems Defined As Being Locally Solvable	General Rank
Lowell	50.0	2	83.4	1
Teayston	7.1	4	43.7	5
Jefferson	28.5	3	63.2	2
Demain	4.7	5	33.3	6
Custer	75.0	1	56.5	4
Ashville	0.0	6	57.4	3
Average	27.7		56.2	

Figure 38

A COMPARISON OF THE PERCEIVED DEGREE OF INSTITUTIONAL COORDINATION INHERENT IN THE PROPOSED SOLUTIONS TO WATER AND GENERAL PROBLEMS IN THE SIX COMMUNITIES

City	Percent of Water Problems Requiring Coordination	Water Rank	Percent of General Problems Requiring Coordination	General Rank
Lowell	5.5	4	44.4	1
Teayston	6.2	3	42.5	2
Jefferson	5.2	5	31.5	5
Demain	14.0	2	33.3	3
Custer	0.0	6	33.3	4
Ashville	28.6	1	28.6	6
Average	9.9		35.3	

Figure 39

A COMPARISON OF THE PERCENTAGE OF "PUBLIC" RESPONSIBILITY INHERENT IN THE PROPOSED SOLUTIONS TO WATER AND GENERAL PROBLEMS IN THE SIX COMMUNITIES

City	Percent of Water Problems Defined as Public Concerns	Water Rank	Percent of General Problems Defined As Public Concerns	General Rank
Lowell	72.2	3	16.7	6
Teayston	68.7	5	31.3	4
Jefferson	89.4	2	26.3	5
Demain	90.4	1	47.6	2
Custer	66.6	6	55.6	1
Ashville	71.5	4	42.8	3
Average	76.4		36.7	